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ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS:
MAKING THE CASE FOR ACCESS TO
EVIDENCE OF A POLICE OFFICER’S
PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE
LUKE RYAN
MOLLY RYAN STREHORN*
INTRODUCTION
“When it comes down to whose story to believe—the criminal
suspect or the police officer—in situations unlikely to involve other
witnesses, the officer has a distinct advantage.”1 This advantage is
particularly pronounced in cases where the criminal defendant con
tends that the officer was the first (or only) aggressor and the of
ficer maintains that he or she only used force as an appropriate last
resort in response to the defendant’s criminally violent behavior.2
In fact, even in cases where the defendant is able to produce
percipient witnesses,
[t]hose who attempt to corroborate allegations of brutality are
often dismissed as untrustworthy or self-serving, because they are
often friends or relatives of the [defendant], or gang members, or
* This Article would not have been possible without the love and support we
received from our spouses, Mara and Kregg; our parents, Michael and Judy; our sisters,
Maggie and Bridie; and our sons, Matan, Quinn, and Eber. We would also like to thank
and acknowledge David Hoose for his mentorship, Barb Munro for her friendship, and
Bonnie Allen for her inspiring advocacy on behalf of indigent defendants.
1. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 466 (2004).
2. As will be discussed,
[p]olice officers will [sometimes] invent cover charges when a suspect is in
jured during apprehension or while in custody. In order for the officer to de
fend against a potential claim of excessive force, he will attest that the injuries
were a result of the defendant’s assault on the officer or on the defendant’s
having resisted apprehension.
David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
455, 476 (1999); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omis
sion of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993)
(describing this process as “[l]ying to cover a mistake and [using] a criminal charge to
buttress the lie” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
73
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people who have had brushes with the law, or uneducated and
inarticulate, or, for a variety of other reasons, easy to
marginalize.3

Once “such corroboration is discounted, and . . . the credibility
dispute is falsely reduced to a swearing contest between officer and
[defendant], the tie goes to the officer.”4 In the eyes of the factfinder, the police are presumed to be disinterested witnesses
whereas defendants have an obvious stake in the outcome of the
proceedings.5
For defense counsel facing this predicament, the standard pro
tocol throughout the country has included an investigation into the
arresting officer’s history of using unnecessary or excessive force,
with an eye towards introducing such evidence at trial.6 Indeed,
3. Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001).
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 233, 245 (1998) (“Police testimony, even perjurious testimony, is more persuasive
to juries than testimony by civilian witnesses. . . . [O]fficers have special credibility. In a
confrontation between a civilian and a ‘blue knight,’ a clear-eyed uniformed police of
ficer, jurors may well bend over backwards to believe the person in blue.”). Sadly, the
penchant for crediting the testimony of police officers just because they are police of
ficers does not appear to be a phenomenon limited to juries. As one judge stated while
speaking on the condition of anonymity,
Many times, I feel the police are lying, but I can’t make a finding on a hunch.
I’ve got to have some facts. If the defense can’t show anything, that the police
officer is telling a lie, then I have to find for the policeman. . . . You walk into a
case and as a rule you believe the police officer—you’ve got to believe police
more than defendant.
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 119 (1992); see also Donald A.
Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693,
696 (1996) (“In a swearing contest, the trial judge can discredit the police testimony
only by branding the police as liars and accepting the word of an apparent felon. Typi
cally the police, rather than the felon, will be telling the truth, but in a significant num
ber of cases the police account is false. Nonetheless judges decide cases one at a time,
so the police almost always win the swearing contest. The police are aware of this bias.
The resulting incentives are exquisitely perverse. . . . [P]olice officers indifferent to con
stitutional rights can violate them with impunity.” (citation omitted)).
6. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s Right to Discovery or Inspection
of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of, Peace Officer
Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170, 1175 (1978) (“Within the cases in which a de
fendant, charged with an offense involving violence against a peace officer alleged by
the defendant to have been the aggressor, sought discovery or inspection of the officer’s
personnel records, such disclosure has occasionally been totally disallowed but usually
has been at least partially allowed, either in the form of in camera inspection by or in
the presence of the trial judge or in the form of direct disclosure to the defendant.”
(citations omitted)); see also People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 30 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A
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the general rule seems to be that where the officer is alleged to
be the aggressor, his personnel file may be obtained by the defen
dant, or, at least, the defendant is entitled to have the trial judge
examine the file in camera and determine whether the file con
tains anything favorable to the defendant which is not already
known to the defendant.7

Massachusetts has always been something of an anomaly. Un
like most jurisdictions, Massachusetts did not permit evidence of an
alleged victim’s propensity for violence unless the defendant assert
ing a claim of self-defense was aware of such a propensity at the
time of the incident.8 In other words, unless a defendant happened
to know that his arresting officer had a history of using excessive or
unnecessary force, such evidence could not be admitted at trial.9
Consequently, defendants seeking evidence of officer misconduct in
the custody of internal-affairs divisions usually failed to demon
strate the requisite “specific, good faith reason for believing that
the information is relevant to a material issue in the criminal pro
ceedings and could be of real benefit to the defense.”10
This all changed, or at least should have changed, in 2005,
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) decided
Commonwealth v. Adjutant.11 In Adjutant, the court recognized
that “evidence of a victim’s prior violent conduct may be probative
of whether the victim was the first aggressor where a claim of selfdefense has been asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in
defendant who is charged with assaulting a police officer is entitled to disclosure of the
fact that complaints charging excessive use of force have been filed against that officer.”
(citation omitted)); Meyer v. City and County of Honolulu, 731 P.2d 149, 150 (Haw.
1986) (instances of police officers’ wrongdoing are admissible to establish the original
aggressor).
7. JACK GOGER, GEORGIA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 17-10, at 1133 (2009);
see also Francis C. Amendola et al., Police Personnel Records, 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 681 (2009) (collecting cases); DAVID RUDOVSKY & LEONARD SOSNOV, 2 WEST’S
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 9.8, at 143 (2d ed. 2001).
8. In such cases, a defendant would have been permitted to introduce evidence of
the victim’s violent character “to show the defendant’s reasonable apprehension for his
safety.” Commonwealth v. Fontes, 488 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Mass. 1986).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 750 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Mass. 2001)
(“There was no error in denying the defendant’s request for the victim’s personnel
records because those records were irrelevant. . . . Although the defendant here claimed
self-defense, the defendant never placed before the judge either at trial or at the motion
hearing any evidence that . . . the defendant was aware at the time of the incident of any
acts of violence by the victim.”).
10. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Mass. 1998).
11. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005).
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dispute.”12 Citing the “overwhelming trend toward admitting some
form of this evidence,”13 the Adjutant court ultimately agreed with
the majority view that such evidence is “properly admissible on the
first aggressor issue, regardless whether the victim’s violent character
was known to the defendant at the time of the assault.”14
In the wake of Adjutant, reasonable allegations concerning an
officer’s inappropriate use of force suddenly became relevant to a
material issue in criminal proceedings, i.e., the identity of the first
aggressor.15 To obtain access to such allegations, criminal defense
attorneys across the state began filing motions for third-party
records pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Proce
dure.16 In response, the keepers of internal-affairs files frequently
characterized these motions as “fishing expeditions for possibly rel
evant information”17 and convinced many district and superior
court judges to quash the subpoenas based on the absence of the
“specific, good faith reason” first referenced in Commonwealth v.
Wanis.18
In an effort to bolster affidavits in support of motions for inter
nal-affairs records, many defense lawyers resorted to public-records
requests.19 In Massachusetts, there is a presumption that records in
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
15. The evidence arguably becomes more relevant if the officer in question hap
pens to be part of “a core group of officers who engage in violence or potentially vio
lent action in a more repetitive concentrated way.” Judith A.M. Scully, Rotten Apple or
Rotten Barrel?: The Role of Civil Rights Lawyers in Ending the Culture of Police Vio
lence, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 137, 141 (2009); see also id. at 140-41 & nn.17-19 (citing
studies that show that incidents of police violence are not evenly distributed among
officers throughout a department).
16. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2); see also Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Be Furnished with Boston Police Department Records on Internal Investigations, in
MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CRIMINAL LAW: CONFERENCE 2008 73-78 (2008)
(presenting sample opposition to defendant’s third-party record request).
17. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418 (Mass. 2006).
18. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Mass. 1998); see, e.g., Com
monwealth v. Fisher-Levesque, No. 0723CR010191 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008) (Le
roy, J.) (on file with authors) (order denying motion for internal-affairs records). But
see Commonwealth v. Oyola, No. 0823CR005364 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2008) (Schu
bert, J.) (on file with authors) (order allowing motion for internal-affairs records). In
response to the ruling allowing Mr. Oyola’s motion for internal-affairs records, the City
of Springfield moved for and obtained a stay in order to pursue a petition pursuant to
General Laws of Massachusetts chapter 211, section 3. Id. However, before that peti
tion could be filed, Mr. Oyola tendered a plea and was sentenced to time served. Id.
19. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Summons Internal
Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertaining to Officer
Shawn Crevier at 1, Commonwealth v. Lavalley, No. 0698CR3231 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June
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the possession of municipalities are public20 and should be disclosed
within ten days of a request.21 Nevertheless, many municipalities
maintained that certain statutory exemptions precluded the disclo
sure of citizen complaints alleging excessive or unnecessary force.22
Specifically, records custodians asserted that such complaints fell
within the exemption for personnel file or information23 or were
exempt under the “investigatory materials” exemption.24 In some
instances, the same city law departments that denied public records
requests on such grounds subsequently portrayed motions for thirdparty records as fishing expeditions due to the inability of defense
counsel to confirm the existence of records the city attorneys had
previously refused to disclose.25
The purpose of this Article is to advocate for the establishment
of a protocol designed to give criminal defendants access to critical,
exculpatory evidence in the possession of internal-affairs divisions
of police departments. The establishment of such a protocol repre
sents a necessary response to the endemic problem of “cover
charges” filed by police officers who physically abuse citizens, then
misuse the criminal justice system to justify their misconduct.26
27, 2007) (on file with authors) (discussing how public records request revealed thirtytwo pages of documents related to civilian complaints against arresting officer). See
generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (2008).
20. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(c).
21. See id. § 10(b).
22. See Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line:
Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 34, 37 (“Police
departments often react in a knee-jerk manner in denying public access to records of
internal investigations concerning allegations of officer misconduct.”).
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26(c).
24. Id. § 7, cl. 26(f). Notwithstanding a regulation prohibiting records custodians
from inquiring into the purpose of a public-records request, municipalities have also
denied requests on the ground that they were made by a criminal defendant, or his or
her representative, in the context of a pending criminal case.
25. Letter from Alesia H. Days, Associate City Solicitor, City of Springfield, to
Luke Ryan (Dec. 4, 2008) (on file with authors) (stating internal-affairs division records
“are not attainable by way of M.G.L. c. 66 §10”); City of Springfield’s Response to
Darry Berrocales’s Petition to the Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court Pursu
ant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, Berrocales v. City of Springfield, No. SJ-2009-0079 (Mar. 9, 2009)
(on file with authors).
26. See Sarah Hughes Newman, Comment, Proving Probable Cause: Allocating
the Burden of Proof in False Arrest Claims Under § 1983, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 347, 371
(2006) (citing “[s]tudies of police practices in Philadelphia and New York [that] found
that false charges by police were pervasive and were frequently used to cover street
abuse”); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 736 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)
(recognizing that “[i]f brutality had occurred,” the police “would have had a motive to
cover up the beating to protect themselves or their fellow officers”); Newman, supra, at
371 n.164 (“[T]he police review board found that it was standard practice to lodge a
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This problem is compounded by what has been called the “Blue
Wall of Silence”—an unwritten code of loyalty that compels “all
officers on a ‘scene’ . . . , if called upon, [to] recite identical versions
of what happened . . . [and] support the authoritative version of
events that contends that no brutality occurred.”27
Part One offers a brief history of police brutality and the role
the Blue Wall of Silence has played in perpetuating it. Part Two
provides a synopsis of the law of self-defense, as well as the evolu
tion of the SJC’s attitude toward the use of propensity evidence in
such cases. Part Three gives an overview of the Commonwealth’s
version of the Freedom of Information Act before focusing on its
construction in cases involving records in the custody of police de
partments. Part Four concerns the procedural hurdles criminal de
fendants have had to overcome to obtain records from third parties.
Part Five highlights the drastically different ways municipalities in
Massachusetts respond to requests for citizen complaints against
police officers. Part Six reviews the way courts in other jurisdic
tions deal with requests for documentation concerning police mis
conduct in self-defense cases. Finally, Part Seven presents a
proposal that we believe is sensitive to the legitimate concerns of
courts, record keepers, and law enforcement, while simultaneously
safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants.
Ultimately, the authors hope to show that permitting access to
an officer’s track record of abuse will not only serve the interest of
the particular defendant on trial, but will also promote police integ
rity by causing officers to think twice before engaging in indefen
sible behavior. This, in turn, will leave the public with greater
confidence in the police who patrol their streets.28

charge of resisting arrest or disorderly conduct against anyone who accused the police
of brutality.” (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE F. COLE, THE AMERICAN SYS
TEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 255 (4th ed. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. Christopher Cooper, Yes Virginia, There Is a Police Code of Silence: Prosecut
ing Police Officers and the Police Subculture, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 277, 280 (2009). The
Blue Wall of Silence has been called “the greatest single barrier to the effective investi
gation and adjudication of complaints against” police officers. Chin & Wells, supra
note 5, at 240.
28. As one scholar recently noted, “[P]erceptions of legitimacy play a critical role
in inducing compliance with the law, and conversely, . . . perceptions of illegitimacy
induce non-compliance.” I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy & Testilying, 83 IND.
L.J. 835, 837 (2008).

R
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A. A Short History of Police Brutality 29
“Police brutality is not a new phenomenon in American soci
ety.”30 In fact, along with the formation of the first organized po
lice forces in the middle of the Nineteenth Century came the first
cases of police misconduct.31 By the end of the century, “[p]olice
brutality, corruption and abuse of authority” had begun to present
“American cities with some of their most pressing—and legally vex
ing—social problems.”32
The first in-depth examination of police misconduct occurred
during the Hoover Administration under the auspices of the Na
tional Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.33 Com
monly known as the Wickersham Commission after its chairperson,
George W. Wickersham, the group published fourteen papers in
June of 1930, including a “Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforce
ment.”34 “In uncompromising language,” the Wickersham Com
mission “concluded that ‘[t]he third degree—that is, the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
29. According to one commentator,
Police brutality is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith
with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target. It is described as
“conscious and venal, . . . directed against persons of marginal status and
credibility,” and “committed by officers who [usually] take great pains to
conceal their [mis]conduct.”
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275, 1276 (1999) (omission in original) (quoting JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J.
FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (1993)).
30. Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUF
FOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (noting that “[p]olice abuses” date back to “the early
history of our nation”); see also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall
of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211,
219-21 (2000).
31. David S. Cohen, Note, Official Oppression: A Historical Analysis of LowLevel Police Abuse and a Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
165, 175 (1996); see also MARILYNN JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE
VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 12-29 (2003).
32. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2000); see also JOHNSON,
supra note 31, at 3 (citing “the routine bludgeoning of citizens by patrolmen armed with
nightsticks or blackjacks”).
33. Samuel Walker, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART I: RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
OFFICIAL LAWLESSNESS, at v (1997), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/
academics/upa_cis/1965_WickershamCommPt1.pdf.
34. Id.

R
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confessions or admissions—is widespread.’”35 Although this con
troversial report led to the establishment of the first internal-affairs
bureaus,36 public scrutiny of police brutality did not occur until the
1960s.37
During this decade, “widespread police brutality sparked a se
ries of urban riots, leading the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to
declare that ‘police brutality in the United States . . . is a serious
and continuing problem.’”38 Due to “[a]dvances in technology and
more critical media coverage,” many citizens got their first glimpse
of “police officers using excessive force on individuals engaged in
peaceful demonstrations.”39 By the end of the decade, some began
to feel that “[t]he beating of blacks and other targeted groups was
not an anomaly, but a norm of American life.”40 “Still, bad habits
die slowly.”41 During the next two decades, credible allegations of
police brutality made headlines in cities across the country.42
In 1991, the beating of Rodney King by four Los Angeles po
lice officers placed an unprecedented focus on the issue of police
brutality.43 “A few years later, the Ramparts police scandal gave
the LAPD yet another black eye in terms of police conduct, exces
sive use of force, and related civil rights violations.”44
In 1992, New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins established a
temporary commission to investigate police corruption.45 Among
other things, the investigation revealed
that in contemporary policing, corruption and brutality were
often linked. The Commission found that brutality was, at times,
an introduction and, at others, a companion to narcotics corrup
35. Id. at ix (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931)).
36. Id. at x.
37. Levenson, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that this era featured a close examination by many Americans of all their “public institutions”).
38. Gilles, supra note 32, at 18.
39. Levenson, supra note 30, at 7.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 8 (describing the death of a Texas inmate who allegedly committed
suicide in a county jail but whose autopsy revealed injuries in places where they could
not have been self-inflicted).
42. See id.
43. Gilles, supra note 32, at 18.
44. Karen R. Smith, Crime, Punishment and the Central District, 36 SW. U. L.
REV. 323, 336-37 (2007). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of
the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2001).
45. Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report:
An Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 73, 74 (1995).

R
R
R

R
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tion. . . . Police officers told the Commission during private inter
views and public hearings that they were initiated into the world
of corruption by committing acts of brutality. Acts of violence
against suspects and prisoners were used as a barometer to prove
an officer was a tough cop who could be trusted and accepted by
fellow officers.46

In May 2000, the United States Department of Justice pub
lished a report on police attitudes toward abuse of authority; over
900 officers were surveyed, randomly chosen from 121 depart
ments.47 The survey revealed that more than one-fifth of police of
ficers felt fellow officers sometimes, often, or always used more
force than necessary.48 This finding was consistent with a previous
study conducted in Illinois where twenty percent of police respon
dents acknowledged observing other officers using “considerably
more force than necessary.”49
“In April 2001, the city of Cincinnati experienced a riot remi
niscent of the 1960s: an outburst of African American rage follow
ing the fifteenth fatal shooting of a young black man by the
Cincinnati Police Department in six years.”50 The following year,
state and local law enforcement agencies with 100 or more sworn
officers received 26,556 complaints regarding the inappropriate or
excessive use of force.51 Approximately 2000 of these complaints
“were sustained, meaning there was sufficient evidence of the alle
gation to justify disciplinary action against the subject officer(s).”52
46. Id. at 77 (citations omitted); see also David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the
Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481-82 (1992) (“Studies of
excessive use of force point out that a predictable catalyst to abuse is the officers’ per
ception that their authority is being questioned or defied. Even verbal questioning of
authority leads many police officers to believe that their power and position have been
threatened.” (citation omitted)).
47. Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 RUTGERS J. L. &
URB. POL’Y 74, 79 (2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 3
(2003) (citation omitted).
51. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT
POLICE USE OF FORCE 1-2 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ccpuf.pdf.
52. Id. at 1; see also Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring
Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496 (2008). The fact that 2000 complaints were
substantiated is significant in light of the persistent criticism that “internal disciplinary
bodies . . . often fail to take complaints seriously, conduct a reasonable, thorough or
impartial investigation or effectively recommend discipline for officers responsible for
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B. The Blue Wall of Silence
“The existence of some form of a police code of silence in
many police departments across the nation is well documented in
court opinions, scholarly literature, news reports, and police investi
gatory commission reports examining the subject.”53 At its core,
the code “consists of one simple rule—an officer does not provide
adverse information against a fellow officer.”54
While it is impossible to quantify the extent of the code’s im
pact within a particular department, studies indicate that “[s]ome
form of a Code of Silence will develop among officers in virtually
any agency” and efforts to uproot it altogether “will be futile.”55
One such study conducted by the National Institute of Ethics be
tween February 1999 and June 2000 utilized confidential question
naire and interview responses by 1157 officers and 1016 academy
recruits from across the country.56 Seventy-nine percent of the
academy recruits surveyed said that “a law enforcement Code of
Silence exists and is fairly common throughout the nation.”57 Over
half these recruits reported that the existence of the code “doesn’t
really bother them,” and nearly one quarter maintained that the
code actually had a positive role to play in cases where an officer
employed excessive force against an unruly suspect.58
Ultimately, the National Institute of Ethics concluded that the
code of silence is triggered more frequently “by excessive use of
force incidents . . . than [by] any other specific circumstance.”59 In
short, this study lends credence to the claim that the code permits
“violent officers to feel comfortable that their actions will never be
discovered and that they will not suffer retribution from brutal
ity.”60 As one former New York City police officer once put it,
human rights violations.” Andrea J. Ritchie & Joey L. Mogul, In the Shadows of the
War on Terror: Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United
States, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 175, 237 (2008) (observing that complaints are fre
quently “found to be unsubstantiated based on the mere fact that the officer involved
denies that any violation took place”).
53. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 237-40 (citations omitted).
54. Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 575.
55. NEAL TRAUTMAN, NAT’L INST. OF ETHICS, POLICE CODE OF SILENCE FACTS
REVEALED, http://www.aele.org/loscode2000.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Myriam Gilles, Keeping Quiet, Covering Up and Never, Ever Ratting: The Ef
fects of the Code of Silence on Reforming Police Culture, GEO. U. L. CENTER CONTINU
ING LEGAL EDUC., Apr. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 22002097, at *7; see also Koepke, supra note
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“[T]he police code of silence is stronger than the mafia’s code of
omerta.”61
To understand the origins of the code of silence requires a
close look at the nature of police work. According to two commen
tators, “The experience of danger and authority may contribute to
the creation of a police code of silence.”62 In his analysis of the Los
Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry report on the Ram
part Scandal, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky offered this explana
tion for the role silence plays in police departments:
Silence offers cover to officers who abuse the public, lie, and oth
erwise break the law. Silence cements the bond of trust between
partners whose mutual dependence feels like the best protection
in a job where one wrong move can mean death. Silence seems
necessary to officers who view themselves at war with crime,
criminals, and an anti-cop community. Silence is easier than tan
gling with fellow cops.63

Here, in Massachusetts, perhaps no case better illustrates the
way in which the code of silence exacerbates the problem of police
brutality than the 1995 beating of a black, undercover Boston Police
Officer named Michael Cox. While in pursuit of a suspect, Cox at
tempted to climb over a fence when he felt a blow to the back of
the head that “rocked his brain, causing it to collide with the inside
of his skull.”64 Additional blows followed until Cox managed to
30, at 213-14 (“Because of the Blue Wall of Silence, police brutality and police perjury
have been, and continue to be, protected and facilitated by the police culture.”).
61. Cohen, supra note 31, at 192 n.123 (citation omitted).
62. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 251 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Specifically, Chin and Wells theorize that
[t]he combination of the two creates a volatile environment in which the police
may develop values at odds with those of the larger society. As these features
of the police role are incorporated into officers’ underlying values and ideals,
the end result may be a cultural matrix which entails a banding together, a
cover-up, a conspiracy of silence. This facet of police culture, at least in the
eyes of the culture’s members, provides protection. Such a close-knit camara
derie becomes the foundation for personal security in a hazardous, and even
life-threatening day-to-day line of work, where officers rely upon their com
panions for protection. Even otherwise honest officers, in the face of an
other’s misconduct, may look the other way due to the enormous pressure to
maintain silence, and may even commit perjury in an attempt to conceal the
misconduct from courts, prosecutors, and the public.
Id.
63. Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 574.
64. DICK LEHR, THE FENCE: A POLICE COVER-UP ALONG BOSTON’S RACIAL
DIVIDE 133-34 (2009).
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find and flash his badge.65 Once the officers administering the beat
ing realized that their victim was in fact another officer, the code of
silence took over.66 Boston Police Chief Paul Evans would later
chalk up the futility of a four-year internal affairs investigation to
the absence of officers willing to cooperate.67
II.

THE LAW

OF

SELF-DEFENSE

In cases where a suspect has been injured as a result of his or
her encounter with the police, fact-finders inevitably hear testimony
that the officers involved in the arrest used only such force as was
necessary or that the injuries suffered by the suspect were selfinflicted. According to Professor Alan Dershowitz, “such boiler
plate police testimony” tends to unfold accordingly:
We attempted to place the perpetrator under arrest, . . . but
he began to swing wildly at the officers. I tried to place him in
handcuffs, . . . but he started to reach into his jacket for what I
believed to be a weapon. When I grabbed his hands in order to
prevent him from reaching for a weapon, he began to kick in
every direction, hitting his legs against the side of the police car
and other hard objects.
At this point, he fell to the ground and started to bang his
head and body against the pavement. We attempted to subdue
him because we were concerned that he would hurt himself. He
was strong and it took us several minutes to subdue him . . . . All
of his injuries, and ours as well, were sustained as a result of his
resistance and our efforts to subdue him.68

In Massachusetts, these kinds of allegations typically serve as
the factual bases for charges of disorderly conduct,69 assault and
battery on a police officer,70 and resisting arrest.71 While an asser
tion of self-defense has always been available to Massachusetts de
fendants facing such charges, the following section will illustrate
65. Id. at 135.
66. See id. at 145-47.
67. John Joseph Powers, Jr., Note, Eroding the Blue Wall of Silence: The Need for
an Internal Affairs Privilege of Confidentiality, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 19,
28 (2000) (noting “that three of the officers implicated in the Cox beating had nine
prior misconduct complaints filed against them”).
68. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 254 (omissions in original) (quoting Alan Dershowitz, A Police Badge is Not a License to Commit Perjury, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 4, 1991, at B11).
69. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (2008).
70. Id. ch. 265, § 13D.
71. Id. ch. 268, § 32B.

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 13

ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS

4-MAY-10

16:10

85

why evidence of an officer’s history of violence has rarely found its
way into the hands of defense counsel or been presented to factfinders.
A. Brief Overview of Self-Defense in General
The Commonwealth has a longstanding tradition of upholding
the right of citizens to use force to protect themselves from harm.
“That a man may defend his person, his lands, or goods, against the
intrusion or invasion of those who have no lawful authority over
them, would seem entirely unquestionable.”72 Self-defense is appli
cable to a wide range of actions; however, much of the case law has
developed in homicide prosecutions.73
In order to use deadly force to repel an attacker, a person must
have “availed himself of all reasonable and proper means in the
circumstance to avoid combat.”74 This right is also limited to the
defendant who has “reasonable ground to believe and actually did
believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm, from which he could save himself only by using deadly
force.”75 “The right of self-defence arises from necessity, and ends
when the necessity ends.”76 Finally, a person may use “no more
force [than] was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the
case.”77
Ultimately, whether self-defense was warranted and, if so, how
much force was permissible are questions of fact.78 The fact-finder
considers the physical capabilities of the combatants, the steps
taken to avoid the confrontation, and the type of weapons used.79
Attention is also given to the location of the events, particularly
whether the incident occurred in the defendant’s home.80 “Massa
72. Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 133, 137 (1829).
73. 32 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE
SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW § 679, at 703-04 (3d ed. 2001).
74. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975), superseded by
statute, An Act Permitting the Killing or Injuring of a Person Unlawfully in a Dwelling,
ch. 696, 1981 Mass. Acts 1020. While a person must exhaust all possible means of re
treat, there is no absolute duty to retreat where it would put a person in further danger.
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 957 (Mass. 1998).
75. Commonwealth v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1980).
76. Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 1966).
77. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d at 479.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d at 414.
80. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975), superseded by
statute, An Act Permitting the Killing or Injuring of a Person Unlawfully in a Dwelling,
ch. 696, 1981 Mass. Acts 1020.
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chusetts has long followed the evidentiary rule that permits the in
troduction of evidence of the victim’s violent character, if known to
the defendant, as it bears on the defendant’s state of mind and the
reasonableness of his actions in claiming to have acted in self
defense.”81
B. The Use of Self-Defense to Resist an Excessive Force Arrest
One of the earlier cases in the Commonwealth to address the
right of self-defense was based on whether a private citizen had the
right to defend himself from the potentially unlawful actions of a
police officer in seizing contested property.82 The law continues to
grapple with assertions of self-defense in response to allegations of
excessive force on the part of an arresting officer.
For example, Robert Graham was severely beaten by police
officers in May of 1998.83 This caused him to fear the police and
potential future assaults.84 “[H]ospital records admitted in evi
dence corroborated his testimony as to the events of 1998 and es
tablished that he had suffered severe injuries (including a skull
fracture, internal bleeding, broken teeth, and various other frac
tures, lacerations, and abrasions) that required a lengthy hospitali
zation.”85 Sixteen months later, Graham saw sirens approaching his
location and said that he attempted to gain unlawful entry into an
apartment building from the fire escape in order to hide from the
police.86 The officers, responding to a citizen’s report of a possible
breaking and entering in progress, found him on the fire escape and
ordered him to stop.87 Graham fled, entered a nearby apartment
building through a skylight, and hid under a bed.88 The officers
contacted the owner and searched the home.89 The homeowner
also conducted a search and noticed some belongings moved from
under a bed.90 The homeowner looked under the bed, saw a man
“curled up in a fetal position” with his head facing the wall, and
notified the officers.91
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005).
Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick) 133, 136 (1829).
Commonwealth v. Graham, 818 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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All of the officers on the scene told the same story of Graham
violently charging at them when the mattress was lifted.92 “At
tempts to spray the defendant with mace did not subdue him, and
Officer Charbonnier, who weighed 220 pounds, held onto the de
fendant, but lost control of him.”93 The officers tackled Graham in
the hallway and handcuffed him.94
Graham testified that the mattress was thrown back and he
faced an officer with a gun pointed at his head.95
Officer Charbonnier grabbed him from behind and was choking
him with his flashlight, so that he could barely breathe, while an
other officer, possibly Officer Foley, hit him so hard in the face
his front teeth were knocked out. He also was being kicked in
the ribs to get him down, and when he was on the floor an officer
had a foot on his head, and smashed his head into the floor.
Throughout this time, the defendant thought he might be killed
by the police.96

Graham lost consciousness and spent three days in the hospi
tal. Evidence showed a considerable amount of blood in the bed
room where he was discovered and in an adjacent hallway.98
Graham appealed his convictions for assault and battery
against a police officer and resisting arrest.99 The appeals court re
versed the convictions and discussed the use of self-defense during
an arrest where excessive force is alleged.100 It held that the right
to resist the use of a police officer’s excessive force is rooted in the
same doctrine as self-defense.101
A defendant has a right to a jury instruction on self-defense if
there is sufficient evidence for the claim.102 “In determining
whether sufficient evidence of self-defense exists, all reasonable in
ferences should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and, no mat
ter how incredible his testimony, that testimony must be treated as
true.”103 The burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to show be
97

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1075-79.
Id. at 1075 n.6.
Commonwealth v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1980).
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Mass. 1998).
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yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use self
defense.104 In the context of either a lawful or unlawful arrest, a
defendant cannot use reasonable force to defend himself unless the
police officer uses excessive force.105 Both issues of excessive force
on the part of the police officer and reasonable force in self-defense
are questions for the fact-finder.106
C. Evidence of Self-Defense in Massachusetts
Historically, a defendant could only introduce evidence of a
victim’s violent past if the defendant was aware of that past at the
time of the encounter.107 Under this rule, defendants had no right
to access prior complaints about an officer’s use of excessive force
pursuant to Wanis, unless they happened to know about the of
ficer’s propensity for violence at the time of their encounter.108
Then, in 2005, the SJC decided Commonwealth v. Adjutant.109
This decision altered the evidentiary landscape in self-defense cases
by entrusting trial judges with “the discretion to admit in evidence
specific incidents of violence that the victim is reasonably alleged to
have initiated” to show that the victim was the first aggressor.110
The facts in Adjutant were compelling. Rhonda Adjutant was
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter in the death of Stephen
Whiting.111 Adjutant worked for an escort service and accepted an
assignment to go to Whiting’s apartment.112 When she arrived
there, Adjutant telephoned her employer to confirm that she was in
the apartment and received payment.113 During this call, Whiting
snorted two lines of cocaine.114 When Adjutant offered to begin a
massage, Whiting indicated that he expected intercourse.115 Adju
104. Graham, 818 N.E.2d at 1077.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005).
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 750 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Mass. 2001)
(“There was no error in denying the defendant’s request for the victim’s personnel
records because those records were irrelevant . . . . Although the defendant here
claimed self-defense, the defendant never placed before the judge either at trial or at
the motion hearing any evidence that . . . the defendant was aware at the time of the
incident of any acts of violence by the victim.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
109. 824 N.E.2d 1.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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tant called the escort agency again to tell the dispatcher of Whit
ing’s demands and then handed the telephone to Whiting.116 The
dispatcher attempted to explain that intercourse was not part of the
original agreement.117 Whiting requested a refund but neither Ad
jutant nor the dispatcher would comply.118 The dispatcher told Ad
jutant to leave the apartment and stayed on the telephone while she
began to leave.119
According to Adjutant, “when she attempted to leave, Whiting
pushed her onto his bed and retrieved a crowbar from the kitchen,
at which point Adjutant picked up a knife that was lying on the
bedside table.”120 While still on the phone with Adjutant, the dis
patcher requested that the company driver return to pick her up.121
Whiting came towards her swinging the crowbar, making contact
with a countertop and then Adjutant’s leg.122 She nicked his face
with the knife and started to run to the door but Whiting tackled
her.123 Adjutant then stabbed Whiting in the shoulder but he con
tinued to block her access to the door.124 When the drivers arrived
at the apartment, they heard Adjutant screaming and kicked in the
door.125 Adjutant testified that when the door swung open Whiting
continued to advance toward her with the crowbar and she stabbed
him in the neck.126
The main question for the jury was “whether Adjutant acted in
self-defense.”127 Adjutant’s attorney wanted to introduce evidence
of Whiting’s reputation for violence as well as certain violent acts
that he committed while intoxicated.128 The medical examiner con
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Other witnesses offered conflicting testimony as to the sequence of
events that lead to Whiting’s death. See id. As previously noted, “all reasonable infer
ences should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and, no matter how incredible his
testimony, that testimony must be treated as true.” Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d
951, 955 (Mass. 1998).
121. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 4.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The defense had evidence of an event less than a year prior to his death
in which Whiting was attacked in his own apartment by two armed, masked men. Whit
ing believed that one of the men was his dealer who saw that Whiting had a substantial
amount of money in his apartment. Id. When the men demanded the money, Whiting
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firmed that Whiting had cocaine in his system and an elevated
blood alcohol level.129 Two of Whiting’s neighbors testified that
they saw Whiting make sexual advances toward two women in the
neighborhood on the night of his death and that he appeared intoxi
cated.130 However, the defense was barred from cross-examining
these witnesses regarding Whiting’s reputation for violence or prior
violent acts, as these were unknown to Adjutant at the time of the
fatal encounter.131 Even after the prosecutor introduced evidence
of Whiting’s calm disposition, the defense was not allowed to im
peach this testimony with Whiting’s reputation or prior acts of ag
gression.132 The appeals court affirmed the conviction.133 The SJC
reversed and remanded with Justice Cowin dissenting.134
To reach its ultimate conclusion, the court discussed the two
possible ways to use propensity evidence to further a claim of selfdefense. Such evidence may either be employed to (1) show “that
at the time of the assault the defendant was reasonably apprehen
sive for his safety, and used a degree of force that was reasonable in
light of the victim’s violent tendencies” or (2) “prove that the victim
and not the defendant was likely to have been the ‘first aggres
sor.’”135 As Justice Cordy explained, “Under the first theory, the
evidence is not admitted for the purpose of showing that the victim
acted in conformance with his character for violence; under the sec
ond theory, it is.”136 Prior to Adjutant, the SJC had not had occa
sion to rule on the admissibility of evidence offered solely for the
purpose of the second theory.137
The Adjutant court ultimately found that allowing evidence of
the victim’s violent character has probative value and could help
attacked them with a crowbar. Id. He did not back down despite being outnumbered
and outmatched. Id. The men stole the money and left Whiting near death. Id. Whit
ing contacted the police and gave grand jury testimony. Id.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id. During Adjutant’s sentencing hearing, one neighbor testified that he
confronted Whiting about damage to a common yard. Id. at 5 n.4. Whiting, who was
allegedly on cocaine, “chased after his neighbor ‘like a raging bull.’” Id. Two other
neighbors were allegedly threatened with a butcher knife and a friend was allegedly
doused with boiling water after arguing with Whiting. Id.
132. Id. at 5 (omission in original).
133. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 800 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (unpub
lished table decision), rev’d, 824 N.E.2d 1.
134. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 15.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the jury decide who was the first aggressor when the facts were in
dispute.138 Surveying the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions,
the court found it persuasive that all federal courts and forty-five
state appellate courts had adopted the rule “that some form of such
evidence is properly admissible on the first aggressor issue, regard
less whether the victim’s violent character was known to the defen
dant at the time of the assault.”139
Once the court decided that evidence should be admitted to
show the victim’s violent character, a question of form remained.140
Adjutant argued that specific acts of violence perpetrated by Whit
ing, as well as his reputation for violence, should be admitted at her
retrial.141 On this point, the SJC disagreed and refused to admit
reputation evidence.142 According to the court, “Reputations or
opinions are often formed based on rumor or other unreliable hear
say sources, without any personal knowledge on the part of the per
son holding that opinion.”143 In contrast, “evidence of specific
instances of conduct is the most convincing.”144 The new rule al
lows a defendant to introduce “evidence of specific acts of prior
violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to have initi
ated, to support [a] claim of self-defense.”145
Prior to adopting this rule, the court considered the following
five arguments against admitting evidence of a victim’s propensity
for violence:
(1) the danger of ascribing character traits to a victim with proof
of isolated incidents, (2) the worry that jurors will be invited to
acquit the defendant on the improper ground that the victim de
served to die, (3) the potential for wasting time trying collateral
questions surrounding the victim’s past conduct, (4) the unfair
difficulty of rebuttal by the prosecution, and (5) the strategic im
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id. at 7. The court noted that is also the standard set forth in Rules 404 and
405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 10-11.
141. Id. at 11.
142. See id. at 13-14. In taking this position, the court acknowledged that Massa
chusetts would continue to be something of an anomaly since “[a]ll other State jurisdic
tions that admit character evidence in these circumstances admit reputation evidence.”
Id. at 11.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 11 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. at 13.
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balance that flows from the inability of prosecutors to introduce
similar evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts.146

In rejecting these arguments, the majority placed its faith in the
ability of trial judges to “‘weigh[ ] the probative value of evidence
against any prejudicial effect it might have on a jury.’”147 Ulti
mately, the Adjutant court gave trial judges the discretion to admit
so much of a defendant’s proffered evidence as is “noncumulative
and relevant to the defendant’s self-defense claim.”148
In 2007, Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson refined the rule ini
tially set forth in Adjutant.149 While the conflict in Adjutant was
between two people, the physical altercation in Pring-Wilson in
volved three.150 The victim’s friend, Samuel Rodriguez, was also a
party to the dispute and may have been the initial aggressor.151
“Because Rodriguez played a central role in the fight . . . and be
cause the purpose of the Adjutant rule is to give the jury a full pic
ture of the altercation so as to make an informed decision about the
identity of the initial aggressor or aggressors,” Pring-Wilson held
that some evidence of Rodriguez’s history of violence should have
been admitted.152 In keeping with the rationale of Adjutant, the
court again noted the key role of the trial judge to use discretion in
admitting only relevant evidence.153

146. Id. at 11. Justice Cowin’s dissent voiced similar concerns that this type of
evidence, “unknown to a defendant, do[es] little to help a jury resolve the issue whether
a defendant was the first aggressor.” Id. at 15 (Cowin, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 12 (majority opinion) (quoting Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 810 N.E.2d
1201, 1210 (Mass. 2004)).
148. Id. at 13. Trial judges also have the ability to instruct the jury on the purpose
of the evidence in order to help the jury decide the question of who was the first aggres
sor and avoid clogging the process with collateral issues. Id.
149. Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (Mass. 2007). When
the court decided Adjutant, it held that the new rule it announced would only be ap
plied prospectively with an exception made for Rhonda Adjutant. Adjudant, 824
N.E.2d at 15. At that time, Pring-Wilson had already been convicted of voluntary man
slaughter and sentenced, but his appeal was pending. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d at 938
39. His application for a new trial was granted based upon the fact that the identity of
the first aggressor was integral to his self-defense claim, and the trial judge repeatedly
denied his requests to present evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts. Id. at 939.
The SJC determined that the judge’s decision to grant a new trial was not an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 947.
150. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d at 950.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 951.
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In the wake of Adjutant, Pring-Wilson, and their progeny,154
citizen complainants who had previously alleged physical aggres
sion on the part of police officers suddenly became potential wit
nesses capable of corroborating claims that the very same officers
also assaulted the defendants on trial.155 To obtain access to the
identity of these complainants, defense counsel began pursuing cop
ies of their complaints by way of public records requests.156
III.

MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW

Though the release of certain public records was required as
early as the Nineteenth Century, “the modern Massachusetts Public
Records Law” was not codified until 1973.157 Modeled on the fed
eral Freedom of Information Act,158 the law defines “[p]ublic
records” to include
books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial
statements, statistical tabulations, or other documentary materi
als or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or
received by any officer or employee of any agency, executive of
fice, department, board, commission, bureau, division or author
ity of the commonwealth, or of any political subdivision
thereof.159
154. In 2008, the appeals court clarified that the new rule announced in Adjutant
does not just apply in homicide cases. Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 895 N.E.2d 758, 761
n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
155. While it appears statistically unlikely that many of these complainants were
sustained, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, Adjutant permits the introduction of “specific acts of prior violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to
have initiated.” Commonwealth v. Adjudant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Mass. 2005) (emphasis
added). In other words, a determination by an internal-affairs division that the officer
in question was the first aggressor is not a prerequisite to admitting testimony about the
incident from the complainant. See id.
156. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Summons Inter
nal Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertaining to Officer
Shawn Crevier, supra note 19, at 1 (“Through a public records request, thirty-two pages
of documents related to civilian complaints against Officer Crevier have been made
available to the defendant by the Ware Police Department.”).
157. REBECCA S. MURRAY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RECORDS
LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 4-5 (2009).
158. See id. One significant difference between the federal and state laws is that
while the former includes “specific exemptions from disclosure for confidential law en
forcement sources, such statutory language is absent from the Massachusetts public
records law.” Powers, supra note 67, at 21.
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (2008).

R
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Excluded from this “broad definition of the term ‘public
records’”160 are twelve categories of information.161 These exemp
tions are “strictly construed” in light of a “statutory presumption in
favor of disclosure,”162 and it is the record custodian’s burden to
show that a record comes within the purview of a particular statu
tory exemption.163
A public record request begins “with a reasonable description
of the desired information” delivered either by mail, email, facsim
ile, or in person.164 The custodian has up to ten calendar days to
provide the requested documents or a written explanation as to the
basis of a denial.165 The custodian is prohibited from inquiring into
the purpose of the request.166 If the custodian denies the record
request or fails to respond within ten days, the requestor has a right
to appeal to the Supervisor of Records (“the Supervisor”).167 The
custodian has a duty to advise the requestor of this remedy.168
As the following discussion will make clear, the trend in Mas
sachusetts is “toward more public disclosure of police documents in
an effort to restrict the abuse of power by police officers.”169 Ac
cordingly, an argument can be made that citizen complaints, or at
least portions of them, should be disclosed upon request.
A. Bougas v. Chief of Police170
In Bougas, three individuals were charged with misdemeanors
after the police arrived to disperse a gathering at a home in Lexing
ton.171 As a result of the incident, numerous police reports were
160. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 648 N.E.2d 419, 424 n.9 (Mass.
1995).
161. Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 731 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Mass. 2000).
162. Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r, 404 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Mass. 1980).
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(c).
164. SEC’Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH, DIV. OF PUB. RECORDS, A GUIDE TO THE
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW 6 (2009) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO THE MASSA
CHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW], available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/
guide.pdf.
165. Id. As will be discussed, the statutory exemptions most frequently cited by
internal-affairs divisions are the privacy and investigatory exemptions.
166. Id. at 7. While the custodians are allowed to charge reasonable fees for col
lecting and delivering the records, the regulations encourage record keepers to waive
the fee when it is in the public’s best interest. Id.
167. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.08 (2003).
168. Id. The requestor also has the right to bring a civil action in superior court
or directly before the SJC. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(b).
169. Powers, supra note 67, at 20.
170. 354 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1976).
171. Id. at 875.
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generated, and the police chief received several letters from private
citizens.172 After portions of a couple police reports were printed in
the local paper, one of the defense attorneys filed a public records
request in the hopes of obtaining these and other records related to
the incident.173 When the request was denied, defense counsel filed
suit.174 A superior court judge ruled in favor of the police chief and
found that the records in question fell under the “investigatory
materials” exemption.175 The SJC affirmed.176
According to the SJC, the investigatory exemption served four
salutary purposes. First, it prevented the “premature disclosure of
the Commonwealth’s case prior to trial.”177 Second, it guarded
against “the disclosure of confidential investigative techniques, pro
cedures, or sources of information.”178 Third, the exemption en
couraged “individual citizens to come forward and speak freely
with police concerning matters under investigation.”179 Finally, it
facilitated complete candor on the part of police officers when “re
cording their observations, hypotheses and interim conclusions.”180
In the case before it, the court concluded that the disclosure of
the investigatory materials at issue would “detract from effective
law enforcement to such a degree as to operate in derogation, and
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 876.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. According to two commentators, “A number of courts have questioned
the unsupported assertion that subjecting such witness statements . . . (whether from
civilians or uniformed officers) to public disclosure will necessarily inhibit, or chill, the
full, frank, and accurate recounting of recollections or observations of key events.”
Zansberg & Campos, supra note 22, at 36. As one Colorado court put it, “[T]he proposition that knowledge on the part of individual police officers that the information
they provide to [internal-affairs] investigators will later be subject to disclosure . . . will
have a detrimental effect on frank and open communication . . . [and] should be subject
to careful scrutiny.” Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Colo. 1980). An
other federal judge noted that “the alternative . . . [i.e.,] some possibility of disclosure,”
could more likely incite candor:
In short, officers will feel pressure to be honest and logical when they know
that their statements and their work product will be subject to demanding
analysis by people with knowledge of the events under investigation and con
siderable incentive to make sure that the truth comes out . . . . Thus there is a
real possibility that officers working in closed systems will feel less pressure to
be honest than officers who know that they may be forced to defend what they
say and report.
Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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not in support, of the public interest.”181 With respect to the police
reports, the Bougas court found it significant that these items in
cluded opinions of the police officers on the scene, notes from inter
views with witnesses, and possible future leads of the
investigation.182 As for the letters from private citizens, the SJC
appeared concerned that the disclosure of these items could make
citizens less likely to volunteer information to the police in the
future.183
The requestors’ status as defendants in pending criminal pro
ceedings made no difference to the court. As Justice Reardon put
it, “the statute does not provide a ‘standing’ requirement but ex
tends the right to examine public records to ‘any person’ whether
intimately involved with the subject matter of the records he seeks
or merely motivated by idle curiosity.”184
While the decision proved to be a disappointment for advo
cates of government transparency, the opinion concluded by setting
forth some valuable principles.
[A]n agency such as a police department cannot simply take the
position that, since it is involved in investigatory work and some
of its records are exempt under the statute, every document in its
possession somehow comes to share in that exemption. There is
no blanket exemption provided for records kept by police de
partments nor does the investigatory materials exemption extend
to every document that may be placed within what may be char
acterized as an investigatory file. There must be specific proof
elicited that the documents sought are of a type for which an ex
emption has been provided.185

B. Reinstein v. Police Commissioner186
These principles took on new significance three years later
when an attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union of Mas
sachusetts made a formal request to the Boston Police Department
(“BPD”) to inspect the records of discharged service weapons dur
ing a five-year period.187 The request was denied because the cus
todian claimed that confidential information, such as CORI
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Bougas, 354 N.E.2d at 876.
Id.
Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
391 N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1979).
Id. at 883.
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background information and ongoing criminal investigations, was
interwoven in the requested documents.188
When the case eventually found its way before the SJC, the
court noted that, notwithstanding the presumption in favor of dis
closure and the statutory burden on custodians to prove the appli
cability of an exemption, the typical records seeker “usually starts
with a handicap of ignorance as to what exactly the records con
tain.”189 In practice, this handicap had permitted custodians, armed
with “the not inconsiderable advantage of full knowledge,” to argue
successfully that “any attempt at analysis” would be tantamount to
full disclosure.190
In an effort to level the playing field, the Reinstein court ap
proved a procedure initially set forth in the federal case of Vaughn
v. Rosen,191 whereby records keepers must “itemize and index the
records requested and give detailed justifications for [their]
claims.”192 According to the Vaughn court, such a procedure was
necessary due to the “inevitable [fact] that the party with the great
est interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with desira
ble legal precision for the revelation of the concealed
information.”193 As Judge Wilkey put it,
Obviously the party seeking disclosure cannot know the precise
contents of the documents sought; secret information is, by defi
nition, unknown to the party seeking disclosure. . . . In a very real
sense, only one side to the controversy (the side opposing disclo
sure) is in a position confidently to make statements categorizing
information . . . .194

Ultimately, the Reinstein court based its decision to remand
the matter on a then-recent amendment to the public records law,
which extended access “to any nonexempt ‘segregable portion’ of a
public record.”195 In other words, the fact that a document may
contain some exempt material does not justify barring access to all
of it.196
188. Id. at 883-84.
189. Id. at 888.
190. Id.
191. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
192. Reinstein, 391 N.E.2d at 888.
193. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823.
194. Id. at 823-24.
195. Reinstein, 391 N.E.2d at 885.
196. Id. at 886. The court also relied on the newly created statutory duty of seg
regation to resolve the Boston Police Department’s claim that the information in ques
tion was exempt from disclosure pursuant to the privacy exemption. See id. at 887-88.
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C. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Commissioner197
On September 15, 1992, a reporter from the Boston Globe
made a public records request for materials compiled by the
internal-affairs division of the Boston Police Department during its
probe of alleged police misconduct in the investigation of the mur
der of Carol Stuart and the shooting of her husband, Charles Stu
art.198 This probe was preceded by a federal investigation which
culminated with a twenty-page report and press release docu
menting egregious police misconduct.199 According to the federal
report, the Boston police coerced several witnesses into identifying
a black man as the Stuarts’ assailant.200 In response to the federal
report, the Boston Police Department issued its own fifty-three
page report, which paraphrased civilian and police officer
interviews.201
In spite of these substantial prior disclosures, the records custo
dian declined to provide the information requested, thereby
prompting the newspaper and its reporter to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief in the superior court.202 After hearing testimony
from several witnesses, the trial judge produced a lengthy and de
tailed memorandum evincing a painstaking in camera review of the
materials.203 Based, in part, on the extensive publicity previously
given to information the Boston Police Department had voluntarily
disclosed,204 the judge ordered the records custodian to provide cer
tain materials that might otherwise have been protected pursuant to
the privacy or investigatory exemptions.
On appeal, the SJC separated the records in question into five
distinct categories and applied the different exemption standards to
each.205 Through this process, the court was able to identify which
Public records regulations now refer to this practice as “indexing.” See 950 MASS.
CODE REGS. 32.08 (2003).
197. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1995).
198. Id. at 423-24.
199. Id. at 423.
200. Id. As it turned out, Charles Stuart murdered his wife and then shot himself
prior to concocting a cover story that they had been attacked by an unknown black
assailant. See Charles A. Radin, A Mirror on Race: 1989 Slaying Forced the City to
Confront Its Divisions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1999, at A1.
201. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 423.
202. Id. at 423-24.
203. Id. at 424. In the future, the court suggested a protective order may serve as
a more time-efficient method to analyze the issues and promote judicial economy. Id.
at 430.
204. Id. at 424.
205. Id.
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records would be made public and which qualified for exemptions,
thereby reinforcing the rule that there are no blanket
exemptions.206
With respect to the privacy exemption,207 the SJC held that its
invocation “require[d] a balancing between any claimed invasion of
privacy and the interest of the public in disclosure.”208 According
to the court, privacy interests were implicated whenever “disclosure
would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal
sensibilities,” where “the materials sought contain[ed] intimate de
tails of a highly personal nature,” or when “the same information is
[un]available from other sources.”209 On the other side of the scale
was the public’s interest in discovery, which included the value of
knowing that public servants were following the rule of law in per
formance of their duties.210
In contrast, the investigatory exemption did not require a bal
ancing test but rather a two-part analysis.211 The first question was
whether the requested documents were “investigatory materials
necessarily compiled out of the public view.”212 The second asked
whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of
effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the
public interest.”213
The court’s ultimate findings regarding the records in question,
though interesting, have limited precedential value in resolving the
status of citizen complaints alleging police brutality. This becomes
clear when one considers that the statements at issue in the Globe
case were obtained from witnesses of police misconduct who had to

206. Id. at 425.
207. This exemption “creates two categories of records exempt from public dis
closure: first personnel and medical files or information and second other materials or
data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v.
Chief of Police (Worcester Telegram II), 787 N.E.2d 602, 605 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Globe Newspaper Co. opinion
dealt only with the second subset of materials. As will be discussed, personnel and
medical files or information are “absolutely exempt without need to consider the im
pact of disclosure upon the privacy rights of a specifically named individual.” Id. at 605.
208. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 428.
209. Id. at 425 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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be prodded or coaxed to “com[e] forward with information.”214
Rarely, if ever, is a victim of police brutality the subject of such
encouragement. On the contrary, it is a well-documented fact that
law enforcement officers frequently “discourage [victims] from fil
ing complaints, using a variety of strategies.”215 In the words of one
former police chief: “The police world has a hundred different ways
of deflecting complaints.”216 In short, citizens who manage to bring
complaints despite threats, misinformation, and coercion are hardly
the sort of individuals whose participation hinges on a promise
“that the public will [not] have access to any statements they
make.”217
D. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police218
In May, 1999, “Shawn Wilder filed a complaint alleging mis
conduct by Patrolman Michael A. Tarckini when, without cause or
explanation, he detained and arrested Wilder at gunpoint.”219 Af
ter a subsequent investigation by the internal-affairs division of the
Worcester Police Department exonerated the officer, a city newspa
per sought documents related to the investigation.220 The records
214. Id. As one federal judge has noted, “It is not uncommon for witnesses to be
reluctant to provide statements alleging police misconduct.” McAllister v. City of
Memphis, No. 01-2925 DV, 2005 WL 948762, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2005).
215. Jenny Rachel Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files Be Public Record? Why
Internal Affairs Investigations and Citizen Complaints Should Be Open to Public Scru
tiny, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1006, 1035 (2009); see also Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Com
munity Consent to Local Policing: The Need for Democratically Negotiated Community
Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 499
n.170 (2001) (“Studies have indicated that police tend to discourage citizen complaints
by acting hostile when complaints are filed, showing lack of objectivity in the investiga
tion, failing to provide formal adversary hearings, and being unwilling to impose mean
ingful discipline on officers found guilty of misconduct.”).
216. ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: PO
LICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting former Minneapolis Police Chief Tony
Bouza)). One undercover investigation of this phenomenon revealed “officers refusing
to provide a form for a complaint . . . and ordering undercover complainants to leave
the building.” Macht, supra note 215, at 1035-36 (citing David Goldstein Reports: Want
to File a Complaint Against a Cop? Good Luck! (CBS television broadcast), available at
http://cbs2.com/goldstein/CHP.File.Complaint.2.516330.html).
217. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 427.
218. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police (Worcester Telegram
I), 764 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002); Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d 602 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003).
219. Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d at 849; Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellee at 3,
Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d 847 (No. SJC-08601).
220. Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d at 849.
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custodian denied this request.221 The paper then appealed to the
Supervisor who directed the custodian to produce the requested
records and “redact[ ] only the names and identifying details of vol
untary witnesses, complainants, and informants.”222 When the cus
todian refused to comply with this order, the newspaper brought
suit in superior court.223
As part of that action, the newspaper filed “a motion to permit
inspection of the public records sought, subject to a protective or
der.”224 Concluding that the custodian “could not be the sole arbi
ter of the applicability of any exemption to disclosure,” the trial
court allowed the motion.225 Eventually, this ruling came before
the SJC on the custodian’s petition for interlocutory relief.226
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Spina conceded that all
of the documents requested could be “‘personnel files’ that would
be exempt from disclosure.”227 Nevertheless, given the equally
strong possibility that the documents contained “a combination of
personnel information and other materials that would be segregable
and subject to disclosure as ‘public records,’” the court refused to
permit the custodian to “decide unilaterally, without any oversight,
what documents are subject to disclosure and what documents are
exempt.”228 In the final analysis, the court regarded the custodian’s
designation of the records to be inconsequential.229 Characterizing
the custodian’s efforts to shield the records from any scrutiny as
“wholly inconsistent” with the purpose of the public records law,
the SJC upheld the limited disclosure the trial judge had allowed.230
When the case returned to the superior court, the newspaper
examined the contested public records pursuant to the protective
order, then moved for summary judgment.231 A superior court
judge ultimately ordered the custodian to “release, as public
records, . . . the entire, unredacted contents of the Wilder file, ex
cepting only documents containing information protected as crimi
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 850.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 851.
227. Id. at 853.
228. Id.
229. “What is critical,” Justice Spina wrote, “is the nature or character of the
documents, not their label.” Id. at 854.
230. Id. at 853.
231. Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
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nal offender record information (CORI).”232 Once again, the
records custodian appealed.233
Citing Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Committee,234 the
keeper of the police records argued that “all the material in the
Wilder file is categorically exempt ‘personnel [file] or information’
because it is part of a disciplinary report.”235 The appeals court
disagreed.
Of particular relevance, the court noted the essential role of
internal-affairs investigations: “A citizenry’s full and fair assessment
of a police department’s internal investigation of its officer’s actions
promotes the core value of trust between citizens and police essen
tial to law enforcement and the protection of constitutional
rights.”236 The court read the Policy and Procedure of the Worces
ter Police Department internal-affairs division to support the con
clusion that public confidence is bolstered by transparency in its
investigations.237 “It would be odd, indeed,” wrote Justice Grasso,
“to shield from the light of public scrutiny as ‘personnel [file] or
information’ the workings and determinations of a process whose
quintessential purpose is to inspire public confidence.”238
IV.

THIRD-PARTY MOTION PRACTICE

IN

MASSACHUSETTS

Of course, it is by now well-settled that “[a] defendant’s right
of access to information gathered by an internal affairs division
does not turn on whether the investigatory materials are or are not
subject to disclosure as public records.”239 When the SJC made this
pronouncement in Commonwealth v. Wanis, it went on to offer the
following guidance to judges confronting defense motions for access
to internal-affairs records unrelated to their own criminal cases:
A defendant may not obtain information in the possession of an
internal affairs division, other than statements of percipient wit
nesses, without seeking a summons for the production of that in
formation and, if production is opposed, without making a
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 731 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 2000).
235. Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d at 605. The Wakefield court had previ
ously ruled that a “disciplinary decision and report” by a superintendent of schools
concerning the conduct of a public school teacher was exempt from disclosure. Id.
236. Id. at 607.
237. Id. at 607 & n.6.
238. Id. at 608.
239. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Mass. 1998).
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showing to a judge (normally by affidavit) that there is a specific,
good faith reason for believing that the information is relevant to
a material issue in the criminal proceedings and could be of real
benefit to the defense. Such a standard meets constitutional re
quirements. Personal information about a police officer, his or
her previous conduct, and the conclusions of those conducting an
internal affairs investigation, for example, should be disclosed
only on such a showing.240

To understand what this preliminary showing entails (and why
it may no longer be an accurate statement of the law) one must
view Wanis in the context of a series of cases construing a criminal
defendant’s right to third-party records related to the treatment of
alleged victims of sexual assaults.
A. Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles241
In 1984, counsel for two juveniles charged with rape filed mo
tions seeking an in camera inspection of the complainant’s counsel
ing records.242 Rather than rule on these motions, a juvenile court
judge reported questions to the SJC concerning the tension be
tween the absolute confidentiality afforded to rape counseling
records by section 20J of chapter 233243 and a defendant’s constitu
tional right to due process.244
Because the plain language of the statute expressly forbade
any dissemination of communications involving a sexual assault
240. Id. at 412 (citation omitted).
241. 491 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1986), abrogated in part by Commonwealth v.
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991).
242. Id. at 236.
243. The statute at issue provides, in pertinent part:
A sexual assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential communi
cation, without the prior written consent of the victim . . . .
Such confidential communications shall not be subject to discovery and
shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding without the prior writ
ten consent of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper or memo
randum relates.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20J (2008).
244. Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236; see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 34 (permitting trial
judges to report questions to the SJC). The two questions were,
(1) Does G.L. c. 233, § 20J . . . prevent this Court from permitting an in cam
era inspection of communications between a sexual assault counselor and an
alleged victim of a sexual assault; and (2) if so, is G.L. c. 233, § 20J constitu
tional in light of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or the cognate provisions of the Massachu
setts Declaration of Rights?
Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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counselor,245 the SJC observed that an in camera inspection could
only be justified by “a determination that the juveniles have a con
stitutional right which transcends the statute and requires the courts
to fashion an exception to the statute (or perhaps, alternatively, to
strike it down).”246
The court then endeavored to “outline certain principles” to
assist judges in deciding when “the absolute privilege expressed in
§ 20J, a nonconstitutionally based testimonial privilege, must yield
at trial to the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to have
access to privileged communications.”247 This process led to a look
at the prima facie showings required by other courts faced with sim
ilar circumstances.248 After noting the numerous ways in which this
burden had been expressed,249 the SJC declined the opportunity to
delineate the preliminary showing required for access to material
covered by Section 20J.250 Instead, the court simply stated that a
defendant seeking an “in camera inspection of . . . privileged mate
rial . . . must show a legitimate need for access to the communica
tions.”251 The court further noted that this hurdle could not be
overcome by proof that the communications were “likely to be rele
vant and material to the case” or that they were unavailable from
any other source.252 Ultimately, the SJC held that the propriety of
in camera review hinged on the defendant’s ability to “demonstrate
that the protected information is likely to be useful to his
defense.”253
B. Commonwealth v. Stockhammer254
The Stockhammer case involved another allegation of rape
where the defense was consent.255 Approximately nine months af
ter the undisputed intercourse took place,256 the complainant at
tempted suicide and received medical attention at Waltham-Weston
245. Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236.
246. Id. at 237.
247. Id. at 237, 238.
248. Id. at 238.
249. Id. at 238-39.
250. Id. at 239.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 239-40.
254. 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991).
255. Id. at 997.
256. The defendant claimed that the parties had intercourse on numerous occa
sions; the complainant testified that the only time that they had sex was the night the
defendant raped her. See id. at 995-96.

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 33

4-MAY-10

ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS

16:10

105

Hospital.257 Two days after her release from this facility, the com
plainant obtained six days of inpatient treatment from a New York
hospital, then four months of counseling from a licensed social
worker.258
Prior to trial, the defendant attained access to the WalthamWeston Hospital records.259 Pursuant to a court order mandating
the production of psychotherapy or counseling records, the social
worker’s records were also produced and the judge conducted an in
camera review of them.260 Satisfied that none of these records con
tained material that would be helpful to the defense, the judge re
fused to order their disclosure.261
After the defendant was convicted, he learned about the exis
tence of the New York hospital records and moved for a new
trial.262 Prior to ruling on the motion, the trial judge conducted an
in camera review of these records and concluded that they were no
more helpful than the social worker records that he had previously
refused to disclose.263
The SJC reversed.264 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
Greaney took issue with the Supreme Court’s then-recent conclu
sion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 265 that “the interests of the defen
dant and the State in a fair trial are fully protected by an in camera
review of [privileged] records by the trial judge.”266 As Justice
Greaney put it,
The Federal standard requiring only an in camera review by
the trial judge of privileged records requested by the defendant
rests on the assumptions that trial judges can temporarily and ef
fectively assume the role of advocate when examining such
records; and that the interests of the State and complainant in the
confidentiality of the records cannot adequately be protected in
any other way. Neither assumption withstands close scrutiny.267

With respect to the “first assumption,” the SJC reiterated its
longstanding concern regarding “[t]he danger lurking in the prac
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1000-01.
Id.
480 U.S. 39 (1987).
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1001.
Id.
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tice of . . . in camera review [of privileged documents]” given the
difficulty for judges to discern “what is necessary to the defense.”268
As to the “second assumption,” Stockhammer expressed the skepti
cism “that the interests of the State and the complaining witness in
preserving the confidentiality of communications to psychothera
pists and social workers can only be protected by an in camera re
view procedure.”269 Citing the “broad discretion” trial judges have
“to control the proceedings before them,” the SJC offered that
“judges could allow counsel access to privileged records only in
their capacity as officers of the court,” and “[p]rotective orders (en
forced by the threat of sanctions) requiring counsel and other nec
essary participants in the trial not to disclose such information
could be entered.”270
At the conclusion of its opinion, the SJC made an important
distinction between the case before it and Two Juveniles. Whereas
the earlier case implicated the “absolute privilege” set forth in sec
tion 20J, Stockhammer involved two statutes271 “contain[ing] ex
ceptions limiting their scope.”272 According to the court, this
difference in the level of legislative protection afforded to informa
tion had implications when considering the extent of a defendant’s
constitutional rights to disclosure.273 In short, Stockhammer ad
vised courts to be less reluctant in ordering the production of docu
ments when only qualified statutory privileges served as the source
of their protection.274
C. Commonwealth v. Bishop275
The Bishop case concerned allegations of sexual misconduct
perpetrated by a Boy Scout leader against two teenage brothers.276
Prior to trial, the defendant filed several motions to compel the dis
closure of certain records related to the treatment of the alleged
268. Id. (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Clancy, 524 N.E.2d 395, 398-99 (Mass. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
269. Id. at 1002.
270. Id.
271. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 135 (2008); ch. 233, § 20B.
272. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1002.
273. Id. at 1002-03.
274. The SJC would later reach a different conclusion in Commonwealth v.
Oliveira. 728 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 2000) (declining to impose different standards
depending on the type of statutory privilege involved).
275. 617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859
N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006).
276. Id.
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victims.277 Following a hearing on one of the motions concerning
records in the possession of a medical clinic, the judge declined to
order the disclosure of “[e]ntries dealing with psychiatric and
mental health assessments and treatment contained in the clinic’s
records.”278
After the defendant was convicted, he asserted that this ruling
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.279 The SJC, in af
firming the conviction, began its opinion with a recitation of bed
rock principles:
[W]hen relevant evidence is excluded from the trial process for
some purpose other than enhancing the truth-seeking function,
the danger of convicting an innocent defendant increases. Rele
vant evidence refers to any evidence which has a tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. . . . “[D]isclosure, rather than
suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper
administration of criminal justice.”280

By the same token, the court acknowledged that the “revela
tion of privileged information adversely affects the purposes under
lying the need for the confidential relationship and serves as a
disincentive to the maintenance of such relationships.”281
In an effort to balance these “competing interests,” the Bishop
court sought to set forth a new standard.282 However, prior to delv
ing into this task, the court paused to make an important point:
because the typical defendant cannot be certain that the privileged
record contains “exculpatory or even relevant information,” a claim
that “nondisclosure . . . violates his or her right to a fair trial is
tenuous.”283
Under such circumstances, “requiring the defendant to make
too substantial a showing to justify piercing a privilege” runs the
risk of “plac[ing] the defendant in a ‘Catch-22’ situation.”284 In or
der to obtain “access to the privileged records [the] defendant must
277. Id. at 993-94.
278. Id. at 994 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Id.
280. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602
A.2d 1290, 1299 (Pa. 1992) (Zappala, J., dissenting)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 995.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 996 n.6.
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specifically allege what useful information may be contained in the
target records. However, [the] defendant has no way of making
these specific allegations until he has seen the contents of the
records.”285
Ultimately, Bishop settled on a threshold showing that re
quired a defendant to “advance, in good faith, at least some factual
basis which indicates how the privileged records are likely to be
relevant to an issue in the case.”286 For defendants able to over
come this initial burden, the next step in the process entailed judi
cial scrutiny of the records.287 Assuming the reviewing judge found
at least some portion of the records relevant, Bishop established a
defendant’s right to “access to the relevant privileged materials for
the limited purpose of” filing a motion to disclose “the relevant
communications to the trier of fact.”288
D. Commonwealth v. Fuller289
Like Stockhammer, Fuller involved allegations of sexually as
saultive behavior where the defense was consent.290 Unlike
Stockhammer where the privileges in question were qualified in na
ture, the privilege at issue in Fuller was the same “absolute privi
lege” at the heart of Two Juveniles.
During the discovery process, the prosecution informed Fuller
that his accuser had received counseling after the incident from a
rape crisis center (the “Center”) “and also that she had received
similar counseling in 1991 and 1992, after a sexual assault in 1991
involving a different perpetrator.”291 When a superior court judge
ordered the Center to produce all records of the complainant’s
counseling along with a letter identifying any pertinent privileges, it
refused to do so without the complainant’s consent.292 This led the
superior court judge to hold the executive director of the Center in
285. Id. (quoting People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 96 (Ill. 1988) (Simon, J., dissent
ing)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Id. at 996-97. “In considering the defendant’s request,” Justice Nolan wrote,
“the judge may consider, among other things, the nature of the privilege claimed, the
date the target records were produced relative to the date or dates of the alleged inci
dent, and the nature of the crimes charged.” Id. at 997.
287. Id. at 996.
288. Id. at 997.
289. 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859
N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006).
290. Id. at 849-50.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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contempt.293 A single justice of the appeals court subsequently
stayed this order, and the case was transferred to the SJC by its own
motion.294
In the process of vacating the contempt order, Justice Greaney
modified the prima facie showing needed to convince judges to con
duct in camera reviews of rape counseling records.295 Because
Bishop’s “likely to be relevant” standard had proven to be “too
broad and flexible when applied to records protected by § 20J,”
Fuller adopted “more stringent” criteria designed to curtail the
number of instances in which the absolute privilege would be abro
gated.296 Specifically, the Fuller court held that
[a] judge should undertake an in camera review of records privi
leged under § 20J, only when a defendant’s motion for produc
tion of the records has demonstrated a good faith, specific, and
reasonable basis for believing that the records will contain excul
patory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the
defendant’s guilt.297

E. Commonwealth v. Wanis298
On the night of February 6, 1997, a uniformed Boston police
officer observed three men pass through an area near Faneuil Hall
where the public was not permitted.299 When the officer advised
the three men to leave the area, one of them allegedly responded in
a threatening manner.300 While attempting to subdue this suspect,
another purportedly “reached into the pocket of his leather jacket,
while the third attempted to intervene on behalf of the other
two.”301 The officer subsequently produced his service revolver and
arrested the men on charges of assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon, assault and battery on a police officer, resisting
arrest, and disorderly conduct.302 In the wake of this incident, one
293. Id. at 849.
294. Id. at 849-50.
295. Id. at 854-56.
296. Id. at 854-55.
297. Id. at 855; see also id. (defining “material evidence” as “evidence which is
not only likely to meet criteria of admissibility, but which also tends to create a reasona
ble doubt that might not otherwise exist”).
298. 690 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1998).
299. Id. at 409.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 410.
302. Id.
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of the defendants filed a citizen complaint against the officer with
the Boston Police Department (“BPD”).303
When attorneys for two of the defendants moved for the pro
duction of BPD records related to the incident, a judge found that
each defendant was entitled to “receive all statements relating to
this case by police, other witnesses and co-defendants in the cus
tody of the Commonwealth including police department.”304 This
order compelled the “production of statements of percipient wit
nesses obtained during the ongoing investigation conducted by the
internal affairs division of the [BPD].”305
Both the BPD and the Commonwealth filed petitions for relief
from the order pursuant to General Laws of Massachusetts chapter
211, section 3.306 In its petition, the BPD took the position that
“internal affairs records are exempt from disclosure as public
records” because they are “(1) ‘investigatory materials,’ . . . and (2)
materials relating to a person ‘the disclosure of which may consti
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’”307 Characteriz
ing these exemptions as “similar” to the statutory privileges at issue
in sexual assault cases,308 the BPD argued that the stringent prelim
inary showing set forth in Fuller applied and the defendants had
failed to satisfy it.309
For Chief Justice Wilkins, whether the statements at issue were
subject to disclosure as public records was a red herring.310 “Even
if the custodian of internal affairs documents could meet the statu
tory burden of showing with specificity that an exemption applies, a
criminal defendant may nevertheless have a right to obtain such
documents.”311 Ultimately, the court concluded that “a judge
303. Id.
304. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. (citation omitted).
308. In a footnote, the SJC appeared to take a dim view of this comparison and
expressly declined to create a common law privilege to protect the disclosure of state
ments made to internal-affairs divisions. See id. at 410 n.3.
309. Id. at 410.
310. It is worth noting that while the Wanis defendants did “not argue that the
subject records are public records under G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth,” id. at 642, the
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys made no such concession, see Brief Amici Curiae of the Committee
for Public Counsel Services & the Massachusetts Ass’n of Criminal Defense Attorneys
at 9 n.2, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL 33832505, at *9
n.2 (“[S]tatements of percipient witnesses do not fall under exemptions to the public
records law.”).
311. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d at 411 (citation omitted).
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should normally issue a subpoena to the internal affairs division of
a police department directing it to produce any statements of
percipient witnesses,” and that “[n]o special showing of relevance
or need is required.”312 Applying this standard to the case before
it, the Wanis court ordered the BPD to “produce all statements in
its possession or control received from percipient witnesses (police,
codefendants, and others) concerning circumstances relating to the
crime or crimes allegedly committed.”313
With respect to the Commonwealth’s petition, Chief Justice
Wilkins agreed that the Suffolk County District Attorney “should
not have been subjected to an order to produce documents from
the police department’s internal affairs division.”314 Perhaps more
importantly, the court also accepted the Commonwealth’s invita
tion to “restrict any inquiry into Internal Affairs Division files,
other than percipient witness statements, by adopting the restric
tions of Fuller.”315
This invitation came in the final section of the brief filed on
behalf of the Suffolk District Attorney and was altogether ignored
by the defendants as well as amicus curiae.316 According to the Suf
folk District Attorney, adopting the substantial preliminary require
ment set forth in Fuller was necessary to prevent an “unrestrained
foray into confidential records” unlikely to unearth relevant infor
mation.317 As the following passage makes clear, the premise of
this argument rested largely on the limited role propensity evidence
played in self-defense cases prior to Adjutant:318
312. Id.
313. Id. at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. at 411. On this point, the court appeared to give credence to claims that
“all parts of a police department are not monolith,” and that “[b]oth practically and
logically [internal-affairs divisions are] separate and distinct from the rest of a police
department.” Brief of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d
407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL 33832506, at *9. Accordingly, it is now clear
that motions for records in the possession of an internal-affairs division must be filed
under Rule 17, rather than Rule 14, and directed to records custodians at police depart
ments rather than prosecutors.
315. Brief for the Appellant on Reservation & Report by the Single Justice of the
Appellants’ Petition for Relief Under G.L. c.211, §3 from an Order of the Boston Mu
nicipal Court at 49, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL
33832536, at *49.
316. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the Committee for Public Counsel Ser
vices & the Massachusetts Ass’n of Criminal Defense Attorneys, supra note 310.
317. Brief for the Appellant on Reservation & Report by the Single Justice of the
Appellants’ Petition for Relief Under G.L. c.211, §3 from an Order of the Boston Mu
nicipal Court, supra note 315, at 42.
318. Id. at 44-48.

R

R
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The reason for requiring [compliance with the Bishop-Fuller
protocol] is the likely irrelevance and inadmissibilty of even neg
ative facts contained [in internal affairs records]. For instance,
even assuming information of some prior bad act by an officer,
such information is not necessarily material and exculpatory.
Thus, even illegal acts by an arresting or investigating officer are
not per se subject to disclosure, however, because they may be
irrelevant and inadmissible in a particular case. . . .
Further, [a]s a general rule, evidence of a person’s character
is not admissible to prove that he acted in conformity with that
character on a particular occasion. Thus, [f]or the purpose of
proving that one has or has not done a particular act, it is not
competent to show that he has or has not been in the habit of
doing similar acts. . . .
Although a defendant charged with assault and battery . . .
may offer evidence of a victim’s character for violence when he
asserts a claim of self-defense, under the Massachusetts rule he
may do so only if he shows that the violent character of the vic
tim was known to him prior to the incident in question[,] because
the victim’s reputation for violence is relevant solely on the issue
of reasonable apprehension. Therefore, defendant must show
that he was aware of the allegedly violent character of the police
officers involved prior to the incident in question.319

Since knowledge of an arresting officer’s violent character is no
longer required to introduce such evidence at trial, using Fuller’s
stringent threshold showing to restrict access to prior citizen com
plaints can no longer be justified. This conclusion becomes ines
capable in light of the SJC’s decision to abrogate Fuller “in favor of
a new process that affords defense attorneys greater access to privi
leged information.”320
F. Commonwealth v. Dwyer321
In 2001, the defendant and another individual named
Lomberto were accused of raping and sexually assaulting their ado
lescent cousin over a period of several years.322 Over the course of
the next several months, the complainant received treatment from
an array of mental health care providers.323
319.
320.
Access to
321.
322.
323.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Victor Hansen, Commonwealth v. Dwyer and the New Protocol Governing
Privileged Information, BOSTON B.J., May/June 2007, at 13, 13.
859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006) (per curiam).
Id. at 404.
Id.
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Prior to an order severing their cases, the defendant and
Lomberto sought access to records reflecting such treatment pursu
ant to the Bishop-Fuller protocol.324 These motions were denied on
the ground that the defendant and Lomberto had failed to make
the requisite preliminary showing.325
The defendant stood trial first and was convicted.326 When
Lomberto’s jury could not reach a verdict, the judge declared a mis
trial.327 Prior to his retrial, Lomberto renewed his request for the
complainant’s treatment records, and a different superior court
judge allowed Lomberto’s motion and ordered that all such records
be provided for an in camera review. Ultimately, Lomberto and his
attorney were permitted to examine and copy certain documents.328
Dwyer subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based, in
part, on the denial of access to the complainant’s therapy records.
After the judge denied the motion without a hearing, the SJC or
dered that Dwyer’s direct appeal be consolidated with his appeal
from that ruling and granted his motion for direct appellate
review.329
Due to a combination of errors, the SJC found that Dwyer was
entitled to a new trial.330 In an opinion issued by the full bench,331
the court also took the opportunity to announce “a new protocol”
to be applied “in every criminal case . . . where a defendant seeks
pretrial inspection of statutorily privileged records of any third
party.”332
This decision stemmed from the court’s “continuing concerns
about potential constitutional infirmities of some aspects of the
324. Id. at 405.
325. Id. at 405-06.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. This proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for Lomberto. Although he was
permitted to introduce redacted copies of the records at his second trial, the jury “re
turned guilty verdicts against Lomberto on two of the rape charges and three of the
indecent assault and battery charges.” Id.
329. Id. at 404, 406.
330. Id. at 404.
331. As commentators have noted, Dwyer is unusual in that opinions issued by
the SJC are almost always “authored by a specifically named justice.” ROSEMARY B.
MINEHAN & R. MARC KANTROWITZ, 53 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: MENTAL
HEALTH LAW § 12.153, at 697 n.1 (2007).
332. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414 (noting that “the protocol is not limited to sexual
assault cases”). Prior to announcing the new protocol, the SJC had formed a committee
to “study and present to the court alternatives to the [Bishop-Fuller] protocol regarding
defense access to privileged records in sexual assault cases.” Commonwealth v. Pelosi,
805 N.E.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Mass. 2004).
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Bishop-Fuller protocols.”333 Foremost among such concerns was
“the inability of defendants to meet the stringent Fuller standard,”
notwithstanding the strong possibility that exculpatory evidence
could be found in the statutorily privileged records.334
To obtain a judicial summons for such records under the
Dwyer protocol, a defendant must first establish “good cause” by
demonstrating
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they
are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly pre
pare for trial without such production and inspection in advance
of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is
made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing
expedition.”335

Assuming a defendant can make this preliminary showing, a
court must determine whether the records in question are in fact
privileged.336 If a judge finds that the records are not privileged,
the record holder must “produce all responsive records.”337 If a
particular record is not privileged but nonetheless contains “infor
mation of a personal or confidential nature, such as medical or
school records,” Dwyer gives a judge discretion to “order such
records produced subject to an appropriate protective order.”338
V.

PUBLIC RECORDS LAW

IN

PRACTICE

Prior to writing this Article, the authors possessed anecdotal
evidence that some municipalities have a policy of providing re
dacted copies of citizen complaints alleging police brutality when
such complaints are requested under chapter 66, section 10 of the
General Laws of Massachusetts.339 Armed with the number and
333. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414.
334. Id. at 417; see also id. at 418 (calling the Bishop-Fuller protocol “a courtimposed requirement all but impossible to satisfy”).
335. Id. at 415 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lampron, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76-77 (Mass.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
336. Id. at 420.
337. Id. at 421.
338. Id. at 421 n.5.
339. See Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Be Furnished with Boston Police
Department Records on Internal Investigations, supra note 16, at 76 (“The Defendant is
entitled to the Internal Affairs records he is requesting, but he cannot obtain them by
way of a court order under Rule 17. The proper way to obtain these public records is by
filing a request with the Boston Police Department as required by the Freedom of In

R
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nature of complaints against a particular officer, defense attorneys
practicing in these jurisdictions have drafted discovery motions,
which have resulted in the identification of Adjutant witnesses.
The problem with advocating for such an approach is that
records custodians across the Commonwealth appear to view their
statutory obligations differently. In order to find out just how dif
ferently, three students from Western New England College School
of Law sent letters to 346 cities and towns in Massachusetts.340 The
letter identified the statute, the ten-day period for compliance, and
pertinent case law supporting a citizen’s right to inspect public
records. The letter requested any records of complaints made
against a specific police officer in that municipality. The letter also
asked for a waiver of any fees due to the educational purpose of the
request.
Out of the 346 letters mailed to the cities and towns, only
64.7% replied to the request and barely half did so within the tenday period.341 The briefest response was a town stamp placed on
the original letter request with a written note, “no records.”342 The
longest response was a three-page letter acknowledging the exis
tence of several records responsive to the request that would not be
produced due to a statutory exemption. Interestingly, two towns,
forty-five miles apart, sent this exact same letter.343
Most of the towns, 177 (76.9%), said that there were no
records or complaints and 207 (90%) did not charge a fee.344 A few
found pertinent information and either summarized it in the re
formation Act.”); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to
Summons Internal Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertain
ing to Officer Shawn Crevier, supra note 19, at 3-4 (noting how documents provided in
response to public-records request did not include witness names or statements).
340. A sample of the public-record request is on file with the authors. The three
students who worked diligently on this project were Thomas Gray, James O’Connor,
and Louis DelGiacco. The authors are grateful for their contributions to this Article.
341. See infra Appendix A (detailing responses); Appendix B (listing towns that
did not respond).
342. Copies of all correspondence are on record with the Western New England
Law Review.
343. See infra Appendix A (Brookfield and Templeton).
344. The authors chose to use both the percentages and the raw numbers in order
to give the reader a picture of the full sample. However, we recognize that the percent
age is only reflective of the smaller sample of 216 rather than the 351 municipalities. In
total, 346 letters were sent by the students and received by the towns. There were some
addressing errors and one town where the law students could not find the necessary
information.

R
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sponse letter or provided copies of the complaints.345 Nineteen mu
nicipalities (8%) said that they were unable to waive the fee and
provided estimates of the total cost. The least expensive estimate
was $48.06 and the most expensive was $150.00.346 Several towns
did waive the fee.347
Most of the letters requested records pertaining to the chief of
police.348 In many jurisdictions, the chief of police is one of the
only people with access to the personnel records and thirty-seven of
the responses came from the chief of police. Fourteen acknowl
edged that the focus of the request was the same person offering
the response.349 Only one chief of police in the town of Auburn
recused himself due to this conflict of interest.350
Among those records custodians who denied access to infor
mation, only two complied with their obligation to “advise the per
son denied access of his or her remedies under 950 CMR 32.00 and
M.G.L. c. 66, § 10(b).”351
A final point of interest was the ripple effect that these publicrecords requests caused. The plain language of the statute provides
that a citizen has a right to request public records without needing
to show purpose or cause.352 In fact, pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the supervisor of records, records custodians are
expressly forbidden from inquiring as to the purpose of the re
345. See infra Appendix A (Braintree, Oxford, Northbridge, and Ipswich summa
rized their responses; Chelsea, Dalton, and Sutton enclosed information).
346. Several others provided hourly rates and fees per page for copying. See infra
Appendix A.
347. Towns that waived the fee: Acton, Bolton, Braintree, Chelsea, Dalton, Eastham, Holbrook, Holyoke, Ipswich, Marblehead, Methuen, New Braintree, North Read
ing, Northampton, Oaks Bluff, Pittsfield, Plainville, Plymouth, Sturbridge, Sutton, and
Worcester. See infra Appendix A.
348. This was sometimes unintentional because the request was made of an of
ficer with a long history in the department.
349. The most humorous acknowledgment came from the chief of police in
Aquinnah: “Unfortunately for you, but fortunately for me, there are no records.”
350. Other chiefs of police may have recused themselves by having others in the
office reply to the request, but only one letter formally notified us of this decision. One
hundred and forty-four (66.6%) of the letters came from other personnel. See infra
Appendix A for more information.
351. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.08(1) (2003). These remedies include the right to
appeal the adverse ruling to the supervisor of records. Id. 32.08(2).
352. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(a) (2008); A GUIDE TO THE MASSACHU
SETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW, supra note 164, at 7 n.15 (citing General Laws of Massachusetts chapter 66, section 10(a) for the proposition that “public records are to be
provided to ‘any person’” (emphasis added)).

R
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quest.353 Surprisingly, many towns responded to the request by re
quiring more information prior to releasing the documents or even
conducting a search.354 Several record keepers called Western New
England College School of Law to speak with the students oversee
ing the project, and one town employee called the dean of the law
school questioning the motives of the request.355 In replying to the
letter, many towns sent a carbon copy to other parties, such as the
file of the identified officer, town managers, town counsel, or even
the deans of the law school.356 One chief of police requested a copy
of the final project and a town counselor inquired about the subject
matter of the research project.357
As the foregoing makes clear, the benefits to be gleaned from a
public-records request for citizen complaints are directly tied to the
particular municipality that receives the request. While an arresting
officer may have an extensive record of citizen abuse, if a records
custodian refuses to provide copies of citizen complaints or even
reply to the request, defense counsel cannot utilize the public
records law to strengthen a discovery motion.
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES TO INTERNAL-AFFAIRS
RECORDS IN SELF-DEFENSE CASES
As noted above, Justice Cordy’s decision in Adjutant rests, in
large part, on a comprehensive survey of self-defense cases from
across the country.358 This survey revealed that while courts in al
most all jurisdictions now admit evidence concerning a victim’s pro
353. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.05(5) (“Except when the requested records con
cern information which may be exempt from disclosure pursuant to [MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch.] 4, §7, clause Twenty-sixth(n), [a] custodian may not require the disclosure of the
reasons for which a requester seeks access to or a copy of a public record.”). As one
Supervisor of Public Records once noted,
Under the provisions of [MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.] 66, § 10(b), when interpreting
the public record definition, one is not permitted to evaluate the special cir
cumstances of any particular person seeking access. If a record is determined
to be a public record it must be made available to any person upon request.
The ultimate intentions of the person making the request cannot be considered.
ALEXANDER J. CELLA, 39 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1178, at 577 n.2 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quota
tion marks omitted)).
354. See infra Appendix A (Town of Sturbridge).
355. See infra Appendix A (Norwood, Nantucket, Bellingham, Clinton,
Manchester, Harvard, Otis, Shrewsberry, Acushnet, Wales).
356. See infra Appendix A (City of Holyoke).
357. See infra Appendix A (New Braintree and Marblehead).
358. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005).
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pensity for violence, the form such evidence may take varies
depending on the forum.359
Colorado is one of many jurisdictions that favors reputation
evidence over specific acts of violence. The rule in that state is that
“specific, prior violent acts” are inadmissible if the defendant “did
not, at the time of the offense, have actual knowledge of prior acts
of violence committed by the victim.”360 In such cases, “the defen
dant’s proof of the victim’s character or character trait for violence
is confined to reputation or opinion testimony.”361
In contrast, the California Rules of Evidence allow a defendant
charged with assaultive conduct to offer evidence regarding a vic
tim’s violent character in the form of personal opinion, reputation,
or specific instances of the victim’s conduct.362 Such evidence is ad
missible in California regardless of whether the defendant was
aware of the victim’s reputation or prior violent acts when the al
leged assault occurred.
On the other end of the spectrum is New York. A defendant
facing the same allegations in that state may not offer any evidence
pertaining to prior violent acts by the victim or the victim’s reputa
tion for violence unless the accused happened to be cognizant of
those acts or that reputation at the time of the encounter.363
Based on the foregoing, it would be natural to assume that Cal
ifornia defendants enjoy a distinct advantage over their counter
parts in New York and Colorado when it comes to getting access to
complaints about an arresting officer’s proclivity for using excessive
or unnecessary force. As the discussion below will show, such an
assumption is at least partly correct.
A. California
In 1973, the Supreme Court of California decided the
landmark case of Pitchess v. Superior Court 364 and thereby gave
birth to what has become known as a “Pitchess motion.”365 The
defendant in Pitchess was charged with battering four deputy sher
359. Id. at 11.
360. People v. Ferguson, 43 P.3d 705, 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
361. Id.
362. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a) (West 2009).
363. See In re Robert S., 420 N.E.2d 390, 391-92 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Miller, 349
N.E.2d 841, 845 (N.Y. 1976); People v. DiGuglielmo, 686 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div.
1999).
364. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974).
365. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 621, 622 (Cal. 1993).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 47

4-MAY-10

ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS

16:10

119

iffs and asserted a claim of self-defense in response to the officers’
use of excessive force.366 He requested discovery of previously doc
umented complaints filed against the deputy sheriffs, which he hap
pened to know existed.367 Two of the prior complainants were
unavailable and two others were prepared to testify at trial but
needed the formal complaints in order to refresh their memories of
the details of their interactions with the officers.368
After the trial court allowed the defendant’s discovery motion,
the Sheriff of Los Angeles County sought a writ compelling the
court to quash the subpoena duces tecum it had issued.369 Califor
nia’s highest court declined to grant the writ.370 It held that the
information which defendant sought may have had “considerable
significance to the preparation of his defense.”371 Because “the
documents ha[d] been requested with adequate specificity to pre
clude the possibility that [the] defendant [was] engaging in a ‘fishing
expedition,’” the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s discovery order.372
The California legislature codified the “Pitchess motion” in
1978 by making modifications to both the penal code and the rules
of evidence.373 The penal code sets out the parameters for discov
ery requests regarding confidential personnel records maintained
by state or local agencies.374 The rules of evidence outline the pro
cedural steps defense counsel must take to gain access to such
records and include specific requirements concerning the notice to
be provided as well as the contents of the affidavit that must be
filed in support of the motion.375 The rules also provide guidance
for courts to determine the relevance of evidence during an in cam
era review, along with the authority to “make any order which jus
tice requires to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.”376 According to the
California Supreme Court, the “Pitchess motion” codification
“carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace of
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Pitchess, 522 P.2d at 307.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 307.
City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 621, 622 (Cal. 1993).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2008).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (West 2009).
Id. § 1045(d).
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ficer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s
equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the
defense.”377
It is now clear that the prima facie showing required by Pitch
ess does not compel defendants in California to “prove the exis
tence of the records sought as a prerequisite to a discovery
order.”378 Instead, defense counsel in that state may infer the exis
tence of such complaints “from the facts of the pending litiga
tion.”379 As Justice Hastings once observed, a more stringent
preliminary showing “would make an accused’s rights dependent
upon the highly fortuitous circumstance of the accused’s detailed
knowledge as to the contents of the police officers’ personnel
files.”380
B. New York
One year before California decided Pitchess, a New York de
fendant charged with a narcotics violation requested an in camera
review of internal affairs records to determine if they contained “a
basis for cross-examination of [certain] officers as to prior ‘bad
acts’, in order to impeach their credibility.”381 In opposing this mo
tion, the police department sought to protect the privacy of its of
ficers and took the position that “a subpoena duces tecum cannot
be used to search for evidence in the absence of some showing that
such evidence exists.”382
After weighing the competing public policy interests, the trial
court in People v. Sumpter declined the department’s request to
quash the subpoena and thereby “preclude the possibility of de
fense discovery of [impeachment] evidence, if it exists.”383 In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the fundamental na
ture of a defendant’s right to cross-examination384 and determined
377. City of San Jose, 850 P.2d at 623.
378. Lemelle v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 n.1 (Ct. App. 1978).
379. City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 776 P.2d 222, 234 n.9 (Cal. 1989).
380. In re Valerie E., 123 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1975) (citations and inter
nal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 246 (concluding that a defendant who
“clearly specified the exact material sought, i.e., all information regarding citizen com
plaints for excessive force against the two police officers involved in her arrest” was
entitled to such discovery).
381. People v. Sumpter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
382. Id. at 674.
383. Id. at 678.
384. Id. at 673.
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that “[p]olice officers stand on no different footing than any other
witness.”385
Within months of the Sumpter decision, four other New York
trial courts reached contrary results and denied discovery requests
for records of police misconduct.386 Due to the “unclear pattern”
of these rulings, New York lawmakers enacted legislation applica
ble to all cases where the production of internal-affairs records is
sought.387 Pursuant to that statute, internal-affairs records are
deemed “confidential” and cannot be disclosed without the consent
of the officer or a court order.388 Before issuing such an order, a
judge “must review all such requests and give interested parties the
opportunity to be heard.”389 If the judge concludes that there are
sufficient facts to warrant an in camera review, the personnel
records in question must be sent directly to the court.390 It then
becomes the judge’s task to “review the file and make a determina
tion as to whether the records are relevant and material in the ac
tion before him.”391
Unfortunately, New York cases subsequent to the passage of
this act continue to evince an unclear pattern. In People v. Gis
sendanner,392 New York’s highest court declined to impose a pre
liminary burden upon defendants to establish that an internal
affairs record “actually contains information that carries a potential
for establishing the unreliability of either the criminal charge or of a
385. Id. at 675.
386. See People v. Torres, 352 N.Y.S.2d 101, 109 (Crim. Ct. 1973) (noting that
records relating to prior bad acts by officers would be inadmissible at trial due to the
rule prohibiting introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict denial of such acts);
People v. Norman, 350 N.Y.S.2d 52, 61 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (citing the failure of defense
counsel “to demonstrate any theory of relevancy or materiality of the information
which may per chance be contained in the police records except for the mere specula
tion and surmise that some information may be revealed which may provide the de
fense counsel to cross examine the witness for possible impeachment”); People v.
Coleman, 349 N.Y.S.2d 298, 302 (Nassau County Ct. 1973) (quashing subpoena based,
in part, on the conclusion that defendant charged with assaulting officers was “foraging
for evidence” that might make a claim of self-defense “reasonable”); People v. Fraiser,
348 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (Nassau County Ct. 1973) (finding the possibility that “useful
evidence may exist” as an insufficient “legal basis for a disclosure of records”).
387. People v. Morales, 412 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315 (Crim. Ct. 1979); see also Gary R.
DeFilippo, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: A Discussion of Civil Rights Law § 50-A,
Protecting Law Enforcement Officers’ Personnel Records from Unwarranted Review, 14
J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 103, 106 (2000) (citing N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a).
388. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2009).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979).
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witness upon whose testimony it depends.”393 Instead, all the Gis
sendanner court required was a “good faith [assertion] of some fac
tual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file
will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a
desperate grasping at a straw.”394
Although such a factual predicate appeared to be present in
the subsequent case of People v. Francis,395 the court nevertheless
denied the defendant’s request for access to prior complaints
against his arresting officer.396 The defendant in Francis was
charged with second degree assault and resisting arrest.397 In sup
port of his application for the arresting officer’s internal-affairs file,
the defendant asserted that he was the victim, rather than the per
petrator, of an assault and that the officer who assaulted him had
previously been sued in federal court for assaulting another individ
ual who was acquitted of the cover charges the officer brought.398
Despite the fact that an in camera review of the officer’s file
revealed two complaints of excessive force, the court declined to
order the disclosure of these records.399 In support of this decision,
the Francis court articulated two reasons. First, it explained that
the complaints against the officer could not be used to demonstrate
his “predisposition to assault individuals he arrests” since evidence
of a party’s violent past could not be employed to establish conduct
in conformity therewith.400 Given New York’s refusal to admit pro
pensity evidence for the purpose of resolving the identity of the first
aggressor, this rationale is, on some level, understandable.
In contrast, the second ground for the court’s ruling displays an
astonishing degree of naivety. In this portion of the Francis opin
ion, the court focused on the fact that the complaints of excessive
force “resulted in determinations of ‘Unfounded,’ which means
there was an administrative determination that the alleged incident
had no basis in fact.”401 Based solely on the internal-affairs depart
ment’s assessment of the evidence, the Francis court concluded that
393. Id. at 928.
394. Id.
395. 566 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
396. Id. at 490.
397. Id. at 488.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 489.
400. Id.
401. Id. But see Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 52, at 237; Simmons, supra note 52,
at 496; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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the allegations of brutality were baseless and did not need to be
disclosed to the defense.402
To appreciate the danger of restricting access to internal-affairs
files on such grounds, one need look no further than a recent study
of the Chicago Police Department’s dysfunctional disciplinary
mechanisms.403 As part of this study, researchers reviewed a sam
ple of investigative files of civilian complaints and discovered that
officers accused of abuse were rarely subjected to in-person inter
views and investigators frequently made no contact with other of
ficers who were present at the scene.404 As one former law
enforcement officer put it: “If the Chicago Police Department in
vestigated street crime the way that it investigates police abuse, it
would never solve a case.”405
C. Colorado
In Colorado, the law regarding a defendant’s right to access
internal affairs documents is both clear and unequivocal: “A defen
dant who is charged with assaulting a police officer is entitled to
disclosure of the fact that complaints charging excessive use of force
have been filed against that officer.”406 The source of this rule is
People v. Walker.407
At trial, it was alleged that Walker participated in the robbery
of a Denver bar with two other armed men.408 During the course of
this robbery, the defendant struck the owner of the establishment
on the head with a shotgun, then grabbed his wallet and fled.409
With the assistance of two civilians, a responding officer chased the
defendant to a nearby alley where the two exchanged gunfire.410
The defendant was struck with several bullets; the officer emerged
unscathed.411 During a subsequent search, the stolen wallet was re
covered from the defendant.412
402. Francis, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
403. See generally Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to
Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s
Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251 (2008).
404. Id. at 275.
405. Id. at 273 (citation omitted).
406. People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
407. 666 P.2d 113, 121 (Colo. 1983).
408. Id. at 115.
409. Id. at 115-16.
410. Id. at 116.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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Prior to trial, the defendant sought access to the internal affairs
file of the officer who shot him.413 After a hearing on the defen
dant’s motion, the court elected to conduct an in camera inspection
of the file but limited its review to “sustained complaints of brutal
ity, excessive force, dishonesty, or untruthfulness.”414 Based on the
absence of such complaints, the court ultimately decided not to dis
close any documents to the defense.415
After a jury convicted the defendant, he argued on appeal that
the decision to limit the in camera review to “sustained complaints”
required reversal.416 The Supreme Court of Colorado agreed. Ac
cording to Justice Neighbors, “[a] defendant who is charged with
assaulting a police officer is entitled to disclosure of the fact that
complaints charging excessive use of force have been filed against
the officer involved.”417
The Walker decision is significant for three reasons. First, it
exemplifies the length courts are supposed to go in giving defend
ants the benefit of every doubt when a self-defense claim has been
asserted. As previously noted, in deciding the viability of such a
defense, Massachusetts trial judges must credit the defendant’s ac
count of the incident no matter how implausible that account might
appear to be. Walker serves as a reminder that the presumption of
innocence cannot be overlooked during the discovery phase of a
criminal proceeding.
Second, the Walker court rightly recognized that access to alle
gations of police misconduct cannot be dependent upon whether
such allegations resulted in officer discipline. Indeed, “exonera
tions” by internal-affairs departments must be viewed with a jaun
diced eye when Department of Justice statistics show that “use-of
force complaints received by agencies with an internal affairs unit
were ‘more than twice as likely to be found not sustained than in
agencies not having an internal affairs unit.’”418 Moreover, it must
be remembered that the newly adopted standard in Massachusetts
permits the introduction of “specific acts of prior violent conduct
413. Id. at 121. This officer was the alleged victim of the defendant’s first-degree
assault.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 121-22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 122 (refusing to predicate a
defendant’s discovery rights on the difference “between sustained and unsustained
complaints”).
418. Simmons, supra note 52, at 503 (quoting HICKMAN, supra note 51, at 5).
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that the victim is reasonably alleged to have initiated.”419 Since Ad
jutant does not require conclusive proof that the prior violent con
duct occurred, findings of no fault by internal-affairs departments
cannot prevent Massachusetts defendants from obtaining access to
the underlying complaints.
Finally, Walker stands for the sensible proposition that evi
dence may be discoverable in a criminal case even if it is not admis
sible. As noted above, unlike Massachusetts, Colorado prohibits
evidence relating to a victim’s acts of violence unless the defendant
was aware of such conduct at the time of the alleged assault.420
Since one can assume that the typical criminal defendant in Colo
rado lacks awareness of his arresting officer’s track record of using
excessive force, complaints accusing an officer of brutality will al
most never be brought to the attention of a Colorado jury. Why,
then, did Walker carve out a path to inadmissible material?
The answer to this question may lie in the fact that the infor
mation contained in citizen complaints appears “reasonably calcu
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”421 Ironically,
if a criminal defendant charged with assaulting a police officer is
acquitted, she will often have a much easier time getting access to
the arresting officer’s internal-affairs file if she brings a civil rights
suit.422 The outcome in Walker may well be partly a product of the
court’s discomfort in denying a criminal defendant access to infor
419. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Mass. 2005) (emphasis
added).
420. COLO. R. EVID. 404.
421. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (adopting the
federal definition of discoverable information); MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (same).
422. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Boston, 213 F.R.D. 99, 102 (D. Mass. 2003)
(collecting cases where courts have ordered the disclosure of internal-affairs records
notwithstanding claims that doing so would compromise or chill investigations). This
irony is compounded by the fact that victims of police brutality tend to have a much
harder time admitting evidence of the defendant officer’s propensity for violence once
they become plaintiffs in civil rights lawsuits. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show the person acted in conformity therewith.”). While such evidence may
serve as the cornerstone of a claim against the municipality that employed the officer,
see, e.g., Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (1999) (citing instances where munic
ipalities were held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), due to plaintiffs’ production of “evidence of prior complaints sufficient to
demonstrate that the municipalities and their officials ignored police misconduct”), it is
not uncommon for courts to give an individual officer his own separate trial due to the
potential prejudice that may result when a plaintiff offers evidence of prior bad acts by
the officer to establish the municipality’s liability, see generally Douglas L. Colbert,
Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993).
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mation a civil litigant would have little difficulty acquiring. The de
cision may also reflect a belief that inadmissible evidence of specific
acts of violence could, in some cases, lead directly to admissible evi
dence regarding the arresting officer’s reputation for violence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the following points appear almost
self-evident. For starters, effective advocacy on behalf of a criminal
defendant charged with assaulting a police officer will often depend
on whether counsel can obtain access to that officer’s internalaffairs file. In cases where the identity of the first aggressor is in
dispute, proper pretrial preparation will almost always require the
production of such documents. Corroborating a claim that the of
ficer was the first aggressor is an uphill battle, as fact-finders are
predisposed to credit the accounts of public officials entrusted with
keeping the peace. Testimony from past victims of police brutality
has the potential to counter this natural tendency.
A public-records request may, in some instances, produce the
information a defense attorney needs to find these important wit
nesses and present this exculpatory evidence. However, the fate of
a public-records request too often rests on the identity of the record
custodian who happens to receive it. A defendant’s right and abil
ity to present Adjutant evidence should not depend on the willing
ness of a municipality to acknowledge the existence of citizen
complaints. If a defendant makes a public-records request and the
record custodian fails to provide the documents requested within
ten days, courts should conclude that the defendant has exercised
due diligence and the documents in question are not otherwise
procurable in advance of trial.
There is nothing improper about requiring a defendant to
make a preliminary showing to ensure that the records sought are
relevant and the request for them is grounded in good faith. How
ever, that showing should require no more than a simple assertion
that the officer was the initial aggressor and any force offered by
the defendant was justified in self-defense.
Other jurisdictions, like California and Colorado, have insti
tuted procedures for obtaining internal-affairs records that rely
upon in camera reviews. However, Massachusetts courts have
wisely concluded that trial judges have enough to do without as
suming the responsibility of examining documents with the eyes of
an advocate. The protocol announced in Dwyer affords record cus
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todians an opportunity to draw attention to the privileged nature of
any documents, or portions of any documents, in an officer’s inter
nal-affairs file. The Dwyer protocol also addresses legitimate con
cerns of law enforcement by conditioning defense counsel’s receipt
of personal or confidential information on compliance with the
terms of a protective order.
The primary purpose of the proposal set forth in this Article is
to ensure the fairest possible trials in cases involving cross-accusa
tions of criminally violent acts. Under the present system, reasona
ble allegations of violence on the part of arresting officers are too
often excluded from the trial process. This has increased the dan
ger of convicting innocent defendants and resulted in the improper
administration of justice.
That being said, if our approach to this dilemma is adopted, at
least three other beneficial by-products seem sure to follow. First,
removing inappropriate restrictions on access of internal-affairs
records will likely hasten the departure of the most violent officers
from police departments. Logic dictates that if an officer’s track
record of abuse makes it more difficult to obtain convictions, then
that officer will either be headed for desk duty or will not be long
for the force.
Second, as officers with a propensity for violence leave law en
forcement, the frequency and intensity of police brutality will un
doubtedly decrease. Finally, whitewashes by internal-affairs units
appear destined to become less common the more frequently
judges are put in a position to review their work. In the words of
Human Rights Watch, “[P]olice brutality will subside only once su
perior officers judge their subordinates—and are judged them
selves—on their efforts to provide sufficient and consistent
oversight, appropriate administrative discipline and, when neces
sary, punishment of the perpetrators of abuse.”423

423.

COLLINS, supra note 216, at 5.
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APPENDIX A—RESPONSES
Municipality

Title Of
Respondent

Content

Fees
Waived

Town Attorney

Searching & compiling records;
however, object to request where it
seeks privileged or exempt
material. Sent follow-up letter on
10/06/09 to say that the search did
not turn up any letters. Cc’d:
Attorney Anderson, Acton Town
Manager, Acton Town Clerk,
Acton Chief of Police.

Yes

Acushnet

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter (this response
acknowledged connection). Called
WNEC to find out purpose of
request.

n/a

Adams

Town Accountant

No complaints.

n/a

Agawam

Acting Chief of
Police

No complaints.

n/a

Amesbury

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Chief of Police

No complaints eligible under public
records law and if there were, they
would fall under “c” exemption.
Requested records of the same
person who responded in the
letter.

n/a

Aquinnah

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter. Acknowledged
connection, “unfortunately for you,
but fortunately for me, there are
no records.”

n/a

Arlington

Records
Department

No complaints.

n/a

Ashburnham

Town
Administrator

No complaints.

n/a

Ashland

Executive
Secretary

No complaints.

n/a

Athol*

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter, suggested further
inquiry with town manager and
board of selectmen.

n/a

Attleboro

Keeper of the
Records – Police
Department

No records.

n/a

Acton

Andover

* Athol was one of only two towns to provide a response that included a notice
of the appeals process. See infra Brookfield.
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Auburn

Lieutenant

No complaints. Chief recused
himself from the matter because he
was the subject of the request.
Cc’d: Acting Town Manager,
Attorney.

Avon

Deputy Chief

Extensive search.

No

Ayer

Chief of Police

If records exist, held at Ayer Town
Hall. Supplied address for Town
Hall.

n/a

Barre

Town
Administrator

Will not look until authorized in
writing to pay for fees. 20¢/page.

No

Becket

Unknown

No complaints.

n/a

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Bellingham

Captain

Found 11 pages associated with
request. Cost and preparation for
mailing record $1/page or 50¢ if
picked up. Asked Dean Gaudio
what we were doing; accused us of
having an agenda; the officer
whose documents were requested
made the call.

No

Belmont

Chief of Police

Exemptions under G.L. c. 4,
§7(26), denied request but then
added that there are no citizen
complaints.

n/a

Berkley

Chief of Police

Paper records, limited employees
with access, costly search. Fee is
20¢ per page and $32.76/hour for
personnel. Cc’d: Town Counsel.

No

Beverly

Captain

No records.

n/a

Billerica

Deputy Chief

No records.

n/a

Bolton

Administrative
Assistant

No complaints.

Yes

Bourne

Administrative
Secretary to Chief
of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Boxborough

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).

n/a

Boxford

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

Boylston

Administrative
Assistant

No complaints.

n/a

Chief of Police

One anonymous complaint that
turned out to be a disgruntled
deputy chief, willing to provide
copies. Requested records of the
same person who responded in the
letter (this response acknowledged
connection).

Yes

Bedford

Braintree
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n/a
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Brewster

Lieutenant

Will not look until authorized in
writing to pay for fees. 50¢/page
and $26.03/hr with estimate work
time of 2-3 hours.

No

Bridgewater

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

n/a

Brockton

Sergeant, Internal
Affairs

No complaints. Request reviewed
by Brockton law department prior
to response. Chastised for not
using the proper title of “chief of
police.”

n/a

Brookfield*

Administrative
Assistant

Several records responsive to
request but refuse to provide them
based upon exemption (f)
investigatory materials. 3-page
letter (exact same letter as used in
Templeton). Cc’d: Acting Police
Chief, Town Counsel.

No

Brookline

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Chief of Police

Content. Requested records of the
same person who responded in the
letter.

n/a

Burlington

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).
Standardized form. Accompanied
reply.

n/a

Cambridge

Legal Advisor

No records.

n/a

Canton

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

Carver

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Chelmsford

Administrative
Assistant –
Chelmsford Police
Dept.

No records.

n/a

Chelsea

City Solicitor

One record from internal affairs
investigation enclosed.

Yes

Chesterfield

Town
Administrator

No complaints.

n/a

Chilmark

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Buckland

Clinton

16:10

Telephone call to ask the purpose.

Cohasset

Lieutenant, Patrol
Commander

No complaints.

n/a

Concord

Deputy Chief

No records. No complaints as
Chief for 17 years or entire career.

n/a

Dalton

Chief of Police

Requested records enclosed,
redacted based on advice from
Town Counsel. Waived $11.00 fee.

Yes

* Brookfield was one of only two towns to provide a response that included a
notice of the appeals process. See supra Athol.
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Danvers

Administrative
Services
Commander

No complaints.

n/a

Dartmouth

Records Division

No complaints.

n/a

Dedham

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

Deerfield

Town
Administrator

No complaints. Cc’d: Chief of
Police, file.

n/a

Dennis

Commander of
Support Services

No complaints. Noted that this
does not reflect records of any
other municipality.

n/a

Dover

Keeper of the
Records, Dover
Police Department

No “Officer Griffin” but there is a
“Chief” Griffin, need to contact
Dover Town Administrator.

n/a

Dracut

Deputy Chief

No complaints.

n/a

Dudley

Town Attorney

Will search records and reply
within statutory period. Cc’d:
Police Chief, attorney.

Unknown

Dunstable

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Duxbury

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

East Bridgewater

Administrative
Specialist on
behalf of Keeper
of the Records

No complaints.

n/a

East Brookfield

Sergeant, Keeper
of the Records,
Internal Affairs

No complaints.

n/a

East
Longmeadow

Administrative
Assistant / Office
Manager

No complaints. Search limited to
their jurisdiction.

n/a

Eastham

Chief of Police

Police officer no longer employed,
researching records. Checked file
and sent follow-up letter on 09/28/
09 to confirm that there are no
complaints.

Yes

Easthampton

Keeper of the
Records –
Easthampton
Police Dept.

M.G.L. c. 66, §10(a) allows police
to charge copying and research
time.

No

Easton

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Edgartown

Administrative
Assistant

No complaints.

n/a

Egremont

Records
Department

No complaints.

n/a

Erving

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Essex

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Everett

Captain,
Administrative
Services

No complaints.

n/a
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Fairhaven

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Framingham

Assistant to the
Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Franklin

Town Attorney

No records. Complaints would not
be handled through internal affairs.
Cc’d: Town Administrator, Chief
of Police.

n/a

Freetown

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Georgetown

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Gill

Town
Administrator

Included letters sent to the Chief
about the complaint against him,
follow-up letter sent to the people
who filed the complaint as well as
the minutes of the meeting where
the complaint was reviewed.

Yes

Gloucester

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Goshen

Sergeant

No complaints.

n/a

Grafton

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Granby

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Granville

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Great Barrington

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Groton

H.R. Director

No complaints.

n/a

Groveland

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Halifax

Town
Administrator

No records.

n/a

Hamilton

Chief of Police

No records. Cc’d: file.

n/a

Hampden

Administrative
Assistant

Subject to a fee.

No

Hanson

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Hardwick

Hardwick Police
Dept.

No records.

n/a

Haverhill

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).

n/a

Hawley

Administrative
Assistant

No complaints.

n/a

Heath

Officer Assistant

No records.

n/a

Hingham

Human Resources
Office

No complaints.

n/a

Hinsdale

Sergeant

No records.

n/a

Holbrook

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

Yes
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Holden

Project
Coordinator

No records.

n/a

Holliston

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Holyoke

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection). Cc’d:
Dean Arthur Gaudio, Dean Beth
Cohen, Brenda Garton, Central
File.

Yes

Hopkinton

Administrative
Manager

No complaints.

n/a

Hudson

Captain,
Supervisor of
Internal Affairs

No records.

n/a

Hull

Town Attorney

Will review request and reply at
later date. Cc’d: Town Manager.

Unknown

Huntington

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Ipswich

Chief of Police

Summarized citizen complaint of
rude treatment during traffic stop.
Cc’d: focus of request.

Yes

Kingston

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Lanesborough

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Lee

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Leicester

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter. Cc’d: Internal
Affairs file.

No

Lenox

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Leverett

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Lexington

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Lincoln

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

Littleton

Chief of Police

No complaints in last 11 years,
would be a fee to access prior files.
Estimates cost no more than $100,
requested records of the same
person who responded in the letter
(this response acknowledged
connection).

No

Longmeadow

Records Clerk

No records.

n/a

Lowell

Superintendent of
Police

Forwarded request to city solicitor
for her review. Cc’d: City
Solicitor.

n/a

Lunenburg

Unknown

No records.

n/a
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Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Unknown

No complaints. Told the person
whose info was requested (former
employee), that person then called
WNEC.

n/a

Marblehead

Assistant Town
Counsel

Advised police chief to review
records, will need time to conduct.
Inquired as to the subject matter
of the research project. Follow-up
letter sent 10/14/09, no records, no
fee. Cc’d: Town Administrator,
Chief of Police.

Yes

Marion

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Mashpee

Keeper of
Records

No records.

n/a

Medfield

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Melrose

Chief of Police

Need to obtain permission from
focus of request. 50¢/page and
reasonable labor fee.

No

Mendon

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Methuen

City Solicitor

Sent copies of 1A records.

Yes

Milford

Deputy Chief

No records.

n/a

Millbury

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Monson

Unknown

No records.

n/a

Montague

Board of
Selectman
Chairman

No complaints.

n/a

Monterey

Interdepartmental
Secretary

No records.

n/a

Nantucket

Unknown

Phone call to ask how to send a
response of “no records.”

n/a

Natick

Attorney’s Office

Request being researched and
estimated costs will be tallied.
Cc’d: Natick Police Department.

No

Needham

Lieutenant,
Keeper of the
Records

No records. Reserved the right to
withhold information in the future.

n/a

New Bedford

Assistant City
Solicitor

Denied request under exemption
M.G.L. c. 4, §7

n/a

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).
Requested copy of completed
research project.

Yes

Manchester

New Braintree
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New Salem

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

Yes

Newburyport

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Newton

Lieutenant,
Internal Affairs
Bureau

No records.

n/a

North Adams

Director

No records.

n/a

North Andover

Records
Department

No records.

n/a

North Reading

Lieutenant

No records.

Yes

Northampton

Captain

Redacted record enclosed, can
petition for redacted information
through office of secretary. Cc’d:
Captain.

Yes

Northborough

Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Northbridge

Chief of Police

Summarized content of citizen
complaint, will provide estimate if
need actual court documents.
Requested records of the same
person who responded in the
letter.

No

Northfield

Administrative
Assistant

No records. Cc’d: Acting Police
Chief.

n/a

Norwell

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Norwood

Unknown

Phone call to ask how to send a
response of “no records.”

n/a

Oak Bluffs

Executive
Assistant

Sent copies of 1A records.

Yes

Orange

Administrative
Assistant

No complaints.

n/a

Otis

Unknown

Chief wanted to know why her
name was used.

n/a

Oxford

Chief of Police

One complaint lodged in mid
1990’s, but no record of it, could
try Town Manager’s officer.
Requested records of the same
person who responded in the letter
(this response acknowledged
connection).

n/a

Palmer

Senior Emergency
Telecommunicator/
No records.
Administrative
Assistant

Peabody

Chief of Police

No officer under that name
employed presently or past.

n/a

Pembroke

Unknown

No complaints.

n/a

City Solicitor

Preparing good faith estimate of
costs. May consider request to
waive fees once cost is known.

Yes

Pittsfield

16:10

n/a
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Plainfield

Chief of Police

Requested files of an officer not
working in Plainfield.

n/a

Plainville

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

Yes

Plymouth

Captain

No records.

Yes

Plympton

Administrative
Clerk

No complaints.

n/a

Princeton

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

n/a

Provincetown

Records Clerk

No complaints.

n/a

Quincy

Captain

Internal Affairs files not
considered public records,
protected under 26(c) privacy
exemption, Chief of Police
discretion cited Worcester Telegram
& Gazette.

n/a

Randolph

Unknown

Person unknown.

n/a

Raynham

Chief of Police

Denied request under exemption
M.G.L. c. 4, §7. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

Reading

Lieutenant

No complaints.

n/a

Richmond

Town
Administrator

No records.

n/a

Rochester

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Rowley

Keeper of
Records

Request to waive fees denied.

No

Rutland

Keeper of
Records

No records. Cc’d: file.

n/a

Salem

Captain

No complaints.

n/a

Salisbury

Keeper of
Records

No records.

n/a

Sandwich

Executive
Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Saugus

Assistant Chief

No records. Requests more info
on the type of info requested for
the project, offers help with
project.

n/a

Savoy

Office Manager

No records.

n/a

Scituate

Town
Administrator

Requested clarification of the
request (was it about when the
Chief was an officer or about his
entire career?), also states that
they are new at their job and it
will take them longer.

n/a

Sharon

Administrative
Assistant to the
Chief

No records.

n/a
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Sheffield

Town
Administrator

No records.

n/a

Sherborn

Chief of Police

No records. Cc’d: records request
file.

n/a

Shirley

Executive
Secretary

No records.

n/a

Shrewsbury

Town Manager

No records. Telephone call to ask
the purpose.

n/a

Shutesbury

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).

n/a

Somerville

Office of
Professional
Standards

No records.

n/a

South Hadley

Keeper of
Records

Need to discuss things by phone
before complying with request.
Included phone number.

n/a

Southborough

Town
Administrator

No records.

n/a

Southwick

Keeper of
Records

No records.

n/a

Sterling

Unknown

No records.

n/a

Stoughton

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

n/a

Stow

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledged connection).

n/a

Sturbridge

Unknown

Two phone calls to WNEC prior to
sending letter to say no citizen
complaints.

Yes

Sudbury

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

n/a

Sutton

Unknown

Mailed specific memo with no
cover letter. Sent memo regarding
citizen complaint.

Yes

Swampscott

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Swansea

Town Attorney

No records.

n/a

Detective Captain

No records. Called attention to
the fact that police department
records are only retained for 7
years after the closure of the
action.

n/a

Chief of Police

Several records responsive to
request but refuse to provide them
based upon exemption (f)
investigatory materials. 3-page
letter (exact same letter as used in
Brookfield). Cc’d: Town Counsel,
Selectmen’s Office.

No

Taunton

Templeton
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Tisbury

Administrative
Assistant to the
Chief

No complaints.

n/a

Topsfield

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Townsend

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (the response
acknowledged connection).

n/a

Tyngsborough

Deputy Chief

No records.

n/a

Wales

Chief of Police

No records. Called to ask purpose
of request.

n/a

Walpole

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Waltham

Law Department

Estimate of cost of search.
Estimated total = $150.00.

No

Ware

Administrative
Officer

Denied request under exemption
M.G.L. c. 4, §7 cl 26(c)

n/a

Wareham

Lieutenant

No records. Sent certified mail.

n/a

Warren

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

Wayland

Lieutenant

No records. Cc’d: Town Counsel.

n/a

Wellesley

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Wellfleet

Unknown

No records.

n/a

Wendell

Town Coordinator

No records.

n/a

West Boylston

Chief of Police

No complaints. Requested records
of the same person who responded
in the letter.

n/a

West Brookfield

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

West Newbury

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

West Springfield

Chief of Police

No records. (cc’d: Town Counsel)

n/a

West Stockbridge

Chief of Police

No complaints.

n/a

West Tisbury

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Westborough

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Westfield

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledge connection).

n/a

Westhampton

Administrative
Assistant

No records.

n/a

Westminster

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter (this response
acknowledge connection).

n/a
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Weston

Keeper of
Records

Estimate of cost of search.
Estimated total = $48.06.

No

Westwood

Administrative
Lieutenant

No records.

n/a

Weymouth

Acting Chief of
Police

No complaints. Explained process
of going through the personnel file.

n/a

Wilbraham

Chief of Police

No records.

n/a

Williamsburg

Acting Chief of
Police

No records.

n/a

Williamstown

Records

No complaints.

n/a

Wilmington

Deputy Chief

No records.

n/a

Winchendon

Police Clerk

No records.

n/a

Worcester

Captain

No records.

Yes

Worthington

Chief of Police

No records. Requested records of
the same person who responded in
the letter.

n/a

Wrentham

Records

No complaints.

n/a
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APPENDIX B—MUNICIPALITIES THAT DID NOT RESPOND
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST
Abington

Gosnold

Milton

Southbridge

Alford

Greenfield

Monroe

Spencer

Amherst

Hadley

Montgomery

Springfield

Ashby

Hancock

Mt. Washington

Stockbridge

Ashfield

Hanover

Nahant

Stoneham

Barnstable

Harwich

New Ashford

Sunderland

Belchertown

Hatfield

New Marlborough

Tewksbury

Berlin

Holland

Newbury

Tolland

Bernardston

Hopedale

Norfolk

Townsend

Blackstone

Hopkinton

North Attleboro

Truro

Blandford

Hubbardston

North Brookfield

Tyringham

Boston

Lakeville

Norton

Upton

Brimfield

Lancaster

Oakham

Uxbridge

Carlisle

Lawrence

Orleans

Wakefield

Charlemont

Leominster

Paxton

Warwick

Charlton

Leyden

Pelham

Washington

Chatham

Ludlow

Pepperell

Watertown

Cheshire

Lynn

Peru

Webster

Chester

Malden

Petersham

Wenham
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Chicopee

Mansfield

Phillipston

West Bridgewater

Clarksburg

Marlborough

Rehoboth

Westford

Colrain

Marshfield

Revere

Westport

Conway

Mattapoisett

Rockland

Whately

Cummington

Maynard

Rockport

Whitman

Dighton

Medford

Rowe

Winchester

Douglas

Medway

Royalston

Windsor

Fall River

Merrimac

Russell

Winthrop

Falmouth

Middleborough

Sandisfield

Woburn

Fitchburg

Middlefield

Seekonk

Yarmouth

Florida

Middleton

Shelburne

Foxborough

Millis

Somerset

Gardner

Millville

Southampton

